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I. INTRODUCTION

When he signed the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control
Act on June 22, 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama not only expanded
regulatory oversight over the domestic American tobacco industry, but he
also emphasized that tobacco consumption was a global epidemic that, left
unchecked, would kill one billion people in this century.' He promised that
the "United States will continue to work with the World Health Organization
He did not
and other nations to fight this [tobacco] epidemic. ...
specifically mention the World Health Organization's Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC or Convention), which the U.S.
signed in 2004 but has not yet ratified. The signing of the bill renewed
speculation about the possibility of American accession to the treaty.4 For
much of the rest of the world, the FCTC has served as the primary reference
point by which to judge effective tobacco control policies. This Article
explores the legal ramifications for countries that have acceded to or ratified
the FCTC, especially with respect to guidelines issued by the FCTC's
governing body, the Conference of the Parties (COP). The principal aim is
to clarify the legal effect of the guidelines adopted by the COP both for
countries that have ratified or acceded to the treaty, and for countries, like the
United States, considering accession.'
Barack H. Obama, President of the United States, Remarks on Signing of the Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (June 22, 2009).
2 id.
Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WHO FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL (FCTC), http://www.who.int/fetc/signatories_parties/en/

(last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
4 Scott J. Leischow, Setting the National Tobacco Control Agenda, 310 JAMA 1058,
1058-60 (2009).
s "Accession" is the act whereby a state accepts the offer or the opportunity to become a
party to a treaty already negotiated and signed by other states. It has the same legal effect as
ratification. Accession usually occurs after the treaty has entered into force. The conditions
under which accession may occur and the procedure involved depend on the provisions of the
treaty. A treaty might provide for the accession of all other states or for a limited and defined
number of states. In the absence of such a provision, accession can only occur where the
negotiating states agreed or subsequently agree on it in the case of the state in question.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 2(l)(b), 15, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
"Ratification" defines the international act whereby a state indicates its consent to be
bound to a treaty if the parties intended to show their consent by such an act. In the case of
bilateral treaties, ratification is usually accomplished by exchanging the requisite instruments,
while in the case of multilateral treaties the usual procedure is for the depositary to collect the
ratifications of all states, keeping all parties informed of the situation. The institution of
ratification grants states the necessary time frame to seek the required approval for the treaty
on the domestic level and to enact the necessary legislation to give domestic effect to that
treaty. Id. arts. 2(l)(b), 14, 16.
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The World Health Organization (WHO)'s Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control is the world's first public health treaty, as well as the first
treaty negotiated under the auspices of WHO's Article 19 treaty-making
power.6 The first international agreement establishing evidence-based
provisions for curbing global tobacco consumption, the FCTC was adopted
by Member States in 2003 and entered into force on February 27, 2005.7
One hundred seventy-three parties have ratified or acceded to the FCTC as of
May 13, 2011.8
Like the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, the FCTC was
designed as a compromise solution between a purely recommendatory
instrument and a binding convention, so as to engage countries in an
"incremental and flexible normative exercise" in a novel area:
Member Nations first adopt a framework convention that calls
for international cooperation in realizing broadly stated goals,
and, ideally, parties to the convention will conclude separate
protocols containing specific measures designed to implement
those goals. Multilateral environmental organizations have
used this model to foster international agreement on pollution
control measures and to overcome the resistance of powerful
commercial interests. 9
This has been the underlying approach of the FCTC; the Convention has
been followed by additional action to enhance and clarify the strength and
scope of the treaty.
The COP is the governing body of the FCTC and is comprised of all
Parties to the Convention.10 In accordance with Article 23(5) of the FCTC,
"Signature subject to Ratification, Acceptance or Approval" defines the act where the
signature does not establish the consent to be bound. However, it is a means of authentication
and expresses the willingness of the signatory state to continue the treaty-making process.
The signature qualifies the signatory state to proceed to ratification, acceptance or approval. It
also creates an obligation to refrain, in good faith, from acts that would defeat the object and
the6purpose of the treaty. Id. arts. 10, 18.
Foreword to WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, at v, May 21, 2003June 29, 2004, WHA56.1, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166, 42 I.L.M. 518, availableat http://www.who.
int/tobacco/framework/WHO FCTC english.pdf.
Id. at vi.
Status of the Convention, NEWSLETTER (Framework Convention on Tobacco Control),
May 2011, at 1, availableat http://www.who.int/fctc/publications/convnews issue9.pdf
Emily Lee, The World Health Organization'sGlobal Strategy on Diet, PhysicalActivity
and Health: Turning Strategy into Action, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 569, 591 (2005).
1o "The COP may establish such subsidiary bodies as are necessary to achieve the objective
of the Convention." Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, supra
note 3. One example is the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body for the elaboration of a
Protocol on Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, the first potential Protocol to the WHO FCTC.
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the COP regularly reviews implementation of the Convention and makes
decisions necessary to promote effective implementation and adopt
protocols, annexes, and amendments to the Convention." Article 5.4 of the
FCTC outlines a general requirement that Parties cooperate with respect to
the formation of procedures and guidelines, while Article 7 of the FCTC
specifically requires the COP to issue guidelines as to non-price measures for
reducing tobacco consumption contained in Articles 8 through 13.12 The
COP has adopted guidelines for implementation of four Articles: Article 5.3
(Protection of tobacco control policies from commercial and other vested
interests of the tobacco industry); Article 8 (Protection from exposure to
tobacco smoke); Article 11 (Packaging and labeling of tobacco products);
and Article 13 (Tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship).' 3 The
guidelines for Article 8 were adopted at its second session in 2007;
guidelines for Articles 5.3, 11, and 13 were adopted at its third session in

2008.14
The status of these guidelines as binding treaty law or customary
international law is unclear due in part to competing interpretations of the
treaty and guidelines language and in part to the weight given to the opinions
of certain affiliated treaty bodies.' 5 The WHO's Convention Secretariat has
called the guidelines "a non-binding instrument adopted by an international
body to provide assistance to countries in addressing specific issues at the
national or international level."l 6 In general, treaty secretariats perform
limited technical and ministerial functions; it would be beyond the traditional

"The COP also established several working groups with the mandate to elaborate guidelines
and recommendations for the implementation of the different treaty provisions." Id.
1 WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, art. 23(5), May 21, 2003-June 29,
2004, WHA56.1, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166, 42 I.L.M. 518 [hereinafter FCTC], available at http://
www.who.int/tobacco/framework/WHOFCTC english.pdf
12 Id. arts. 5.4, 7.
13 FCTC, Guidelinesfor Implementation:Article 5.3; Article 8; Article 11; Article 13, at iii
(2009) [hereinafter Guidelinesfor Implementation: Arts. 5.3, 8, 11, 13], availableat http://wh
At COP4, which took place
qlibdoc.who.int/publications/2009/9789241598224_eng.pdf.
November 15-20, 2010, in Uruguay, the Parties adopted partial guidelines for Articles 9 and
10 (Regulation and Disclosure) and complete guidelines for Article 12 (Public Education) and
Article 14 (Cessation). FCTC, Conference of the Partiesto the WHO Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control: Provisional Agenda, available at http://www.coppt.pt/attachments/12
2 FCTCCOP41-en.pdf. At the time of writing, these guidelines were not finalized, but the
analysis included herein will be generally applicable.
14 Guidelinesfor Implementation: Arts. 5.3, 8, 11, 13, supra note 13.
15 R. Hammond & M. Assunta, The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control:
PromisingStart, UncertainFuture, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL 241, 241 (2003).
16 World Health Organization Secretariat, Additional Matters Identified in the Convention
for Considerationby the Conference of the Parties,art. 5, A/FCTC/COP/1/INF.DOC./3 (Jan.
5, 2006) [hereinafter WHO Secretariat], available at http://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/copl/FC
TCCOPiID3-en.pdf.
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scope of the FCTC Secretariat's authority to opine as to the guidelines' "nonbinding" nature.' 7 Philip Morris International describes the guidelines as
"non-binding recommendations to the Parties supplementing specific
The Framework Convention Alliance-the
Articles of the Treaty." 8
umbrella organization for civil society groups created to support the
development, ratification, accession, implementation, and monitoring of the
FCTC-calls the guidelines "principles and recommendations to assist
Parties in best practice implementation of their treaty obligations." 9 A plain
reading of the guidelines' language, as well as interpretive guidance from the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and customary international
norms, supports the conclusion that the binding nature of the guidelines is
stronger than any of these constituencies' statements suggest.20 As the WHO
Legal Counsel has stated in the context of a protocol on illicit trade in
tobacco products, "Decisions of the Conference of the Parties, as the
supreme body comprising all Parties to the FCTC, undoubtedly represent a
'subsequent agreement between the Parties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty,' as stated in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention." 21 Indeed, the
language of Article 7 mandates not only that the COP adopt guidelines for
non-price measures, but that Parties adopt "effective legislative, executive
and administrative or other measures" necessary to implement the non-price
measures found in Articles 8 through 13.22 The guidance issued by the COP
would appear to be instrumental in fulfilling the FCTC-imposed obligation to
adopt "effective . . . measures." 23

This Article assesses the status of the guidelines issued pursuant to the
FCTC as (1) "hard" international law whether treaty or custom-derived; and
(2) "soft" international law that has motivated a range of non-state actors to
demand domestic administrative, judicial, and legislative action that might in

1 See Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global EnvironmentalLaw,
36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615, n.231 (2009) ("[T]reaty secretariats and other subsidiary and technical
support bodies [] typically perform limited secretarial, technical, and ministerial
functions. . . .").
PHILIP MORRIS INTERNATIONAL, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 27 (2009), available at http://me

dia.corporate-ir.net/mediafiles/irol/14/146476/2009Annual Report.pdf.
19 FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ALLIANCE, HOLD YOUR GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABLE: USING

THE GUIDELINES FOR FCTC IMPLEMENTATION 3, available at http://fctc.org/dmdocuments/FC
A

uidelines booklet.pdf.

WHO Secretariat, supra note 16, arts. 5-6.
FCTC: WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Revised Chairperson's Text
on a Protocol on Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, and General Debate, at 5,
FCTC/COP/INB-IT/3/INF.DOC./6 (May 18, 2009) [hereinafter FCTC Revised Chairperson's
Protocol], availableat http://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/it3/FCTC_1NBIT3 ID6-en.pdf.
22 WHO Secretariat, supra note 16, para. 4.
21

23

id
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fact exceed the technical requirements of the treaty.24 The Article ultimately
concludes that Parties are under an obligation to implement treaty provisions
in light of the guidelines. While the guidelines' language includes some
recommendations that, under their ordinary meaning, would not give rise to
mandatory action, they nevertheless have force as soft international law.
Indeed, the preliminary evidence shows that the Article 5.3 guidelinesspecifically Guiding Principle 1-have exerted an influence far beyond what
the recommendatory and highly qualified text of the guidelines demands.
Moreover, other guidelines do impose obligatory action with respect to
treaty provisions. For example, with respect to the Article 8 guidelines
requiring that Member States protect their populations from exposure to
tobacco smoke, the guidelines impose a binding obligation where it is
established that citizens hold, inter alia, the right to life or the right to the
highest attainable standard of health under national law.25 Grounded in
"fundamental human rights and freedoms," the Article 8 guidelines require
States to include "key elements of legislation necessary to effectively protect
people from exposure to tobacco smoke" which constitute a binding
obligation under the FCTC.26
In addition, where ambiguities exist in the treaty language, the guidelines
can serve as an interpretive source for national governments seeking to fulfill
their obligations under the FCTC. This conclusion does not diminish the
enforceability of the guidelines where national governments, including
courts, give them the force of domestic law, nor does it foreclose the
possibility that certain guidelines may become customary international law,
depending on the evolving practice of national governments and their stated
reasons for complying with the guidelines. There is quickly taking root a
norm requiring that States protect their populations from exposure to tobacco
24 The pronouncements of "highly qualified publicists" provide
a fourth source of
international law.
25
The duty to protect from tobacco smoke, embodied in the text of Article 8, is
grounded in fundamental human rights and freedoms. Given the dangers of
breathing second-hand tobacco smoke, the duty to protect from tobacco smoke
is implicit in, inter alia, the right to life and the right to the highest attainable
standard of health, as recognized in many international legal
instruments ... as formally incorporated into the preamble of the WHO
Framework Convention and as recognized in the constitutions of many
nations.
World Health Organization [WHO], Guidelines on Protection from Exposure to Tobacco
Smoke, para. 4(a) (2007) [hereinafter WHO Guidelines], available at http://www.who.int/fctc/
cop/art%208%20guidelines english.pdf. While the legal grounding for the obligation would
originate primarily with national legal sources rather than the FCTC, the treaty would add to
that obligation. Indeed, as intemational legal instruments like the FCTC proliferate, they will
increasingly inform longer-standing but less defined rights like the right to the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health.
26 Id. para.
3.
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smoke that, with some speed, may become a fundamental component of the
right to life and the right to health. Within the nascent but growing literature
on consensus-based decisions of treaty governing bodies, this thesis
implicitly argues that the prevailing theoretical approach-which aims to
identify and separate "hard" international law, based on treaty and custom,
from "soft" international law, based on standards and norms-remains useful
for understanding COP decisions as a source of international law.27 Part II of
this Article provides a brief history of the FCTC. Part III will analyze the
status of the guidelines using the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
as the primary source for rules of treaty construction as well as analyze the
status of the FCTC guidelines under customary international law. Part IV
will discuss soft law aspects of the guidelines, including their role as
interpretative tools used in domestic courts. Part V will situate the
experience of the FCTC within the broader literature on COP decisionmaking.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FCTC
During a meeting of public health scholars in 1993, Professor Ruth
Roemer suggested that the WHO finally make use of its long dormant treatymaking power to address the public health threat posed by tobacco
consumption.28 In 1994, delegates to the 9th World Conference on Tobacco
and Health adopted a resolution Roemer introduced, urging the creation of an
international instrument for tobacco control.2 9 Canada, Finland, Mexico, and
Tanzania supported the idea at the World Health Assembly (WHA), which
adopted Resolution 48.11, advocating the use of an "international
instrument" to curb global tobacco consumption.30
In 1995, Roemer and Allyn Taylor, who developed the idea for a
framework convention on tobacco control as part of her doctoral thesis at
Columbia, collaborated to develop a background paper outlining various
27 See Annecoos Wiersema, The New International Law-Makers? Conferences of the
Parties to Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 31 MICH. J. INT'L L. 231, 233 (2009)
(arguing that understanding consensus-based COP decisions as either "hard" law or "soft" law
is inadequate and that COP decisions should be analyzed with reference to underlying treaty
obligations).
28 Ruth Roemer et al., Origins of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control,
95:6 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 936, 936-38 (2005), available at http://ajph.aphapublications.org/
cgi/reprint/95/6/936.
9 WHO Director General, The Feasibility of Developing an InternationalInstrument for
Tobacco Control, EM97/INF.Doc./4 (Nov. 30, 1995).
30 World Health Assembly, An International Strategy for Tobacco Control, EB95.R9,
WHA48. 11, WHO/PSA/96.6 (May 12, 1995), availableat http://www.who.int/tobacco/frame
work/wha eb/wha48_11/en; Roemer et al., supra note 28, at 937. "Despite some objections, a
text was adopted by the executive board (EB95.R9) and later by the WHA (WHA48. 11)." Id.
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options for international action on tobacco control to be undertaken by the
United Nations (UN) in accordance with WHA Resolution 48.11.31 A
detailed outline of the proposed document was delivered to the WHO on July
27, 1995, setting forth options for an international legal strategy for tobacco
control and recommending the development and implementation of a WHO
framework convention on tobacco control and related protocols to promote
global cooperation and national action.32
In 1996, the WHO Director General issued a brief report entitled "The
Feasibility of an International Instrument for Tobacco Control," summarizing
the key recommendations of the manuscript.3 Despite opposition from the
WHO Secretariat, the Executive Board adopted the resolution, "An
International Framework Convention for Tobacco Control," due in
significant part to the persistence of Jean Lariviere, a Senior Medical Adviser
at Health Canada, and because of the support given by the governments of
Finland and Ireland.34 In May 1996, the WHA adopted the resolution for the
development of a WHO framework convention on tobacco control and
related protocols (WHA49.16).3
Heavy political opposition from Member States stalled progress on the
resolution until 1998, when Gro Harlem Brundtland was elected as WHO's
Director General.36 Litigation in the United States revealed the extent of
tobacco manufacturers' collusive efforts to hide smoking-related health risks,
and key resolutions issued by the American Public Health Association in
1998 and 2001 generated substantial political momentum for an effective
3 Taylor developed the idea for an "international regulatory strategy for tobacco control"
and specifically a framework convention protocol as part of her doctoral dissertation at
Columbia University. Allyn Taylor, An InternationalRegulatoryStrategyfor Global Tobacco
Control, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 257, 283-302 (1996).
32 Roemer et al., supra note 28, at 937. The recommended treaty faced severe resistance
and opposition from various sectors including from within the WHO. A senior WHO official
criticized the Taylor-Roemer proposal as "ambitious to a fault," emphasized that "it is
important to be realistic," and encouraged "revising the outline and preparing the background
paper." For some WHO officials, it was not acceptable that the treaty be formed under the
auspices of the WHO and they were reluctant to make use of their constitutional authority to
develop a treaty on any matter affecting global public health. It was suggested that Roemer
and Taylor think on the lines of developing a WHO code of conduct on tobacco control akin
to the WHO International Code of Marketing Breast-Milk Substitutes, a nonbinding
international instrument that might be adopted by WHA as a resolution, or a treaty to be
adopted under the auspices of the United Nations. However, Taylor and Roemer remained
persuaded as to their original idea and submitted a final manuscript which proposed the
development of a WHO framework convention on tobacco control and related protocols and
recommended substantive and procedural mechanisms that could be included in the proposed
convention to make it an effective instrument of international health policy. Id
3 WHO Director General, supra note 29.
34 See Roemer et al., supra note 28 (identifying the supporting governments).
3s Id.
36 See id. at 938 (remarking on the importance of Brundtland's succession).
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WHO framework convention on tobacco control as part of a growing
worldwide public health movement.
In 1999, Member States adopted resolution WHA52.18, which established
both a WHO FCTC Working Group to draft core treaty elements and an
Intergovernmental Negotiating Body to develop the treaty text.38 Toward the
latter part of 2000, the WHO conducted public hearings, which garnered over
500 submissions from public health agencies, women's groups, communitybased organizations, academic institutions, the major tobacco multinationals,
state tobacco companies, and tobacco farming groups.
Many of these submissions reflected the substantial economic interests at
stake in developing a global regime committed to reducing tobacco
consumption. 4 0 The tobacco industry advocated what Brundtland referred to
as "support for policies and measures that are known to have a very limited
impact on youth and adult consumption of tobacco.""' This meant, in effect,

37 See An InternationalTobacco Control Policy: Policy Number 9809, AMER. PUBLIC HEALTH
Ass'N (Jan. 1, 1998), http://www.apha.org/advocacy/policy/policysearch/default.htm?id=161
(stating recommendations for the U.S. policy on tobacco); see also Tobacco Trust Fund for
Developing Countries to Meet National Commitment Under the WHO Framework Conventionfor
Tobacco Control: Policy Number 200124, AMER. PUBLIC HEALTH Ass'N (Jan. 1, 2001), http://
www.apha.org/advocacy/policy/policysearch/default.htm?id=263 (emphasizing the importance of
the FCTC); Richard D. Hurt, Open doorway to truth: Legacy of the Minnesota Tobacco Trial, 84:5
MAYO CLINIC PROC. 446, 446-56 (2009), available at http://www.mayoclinicproceedings.com/
content/84/5/446.full.pdf+html (discussing the "Minnesota Tobacco Trial" and the Master
Settlement Agreement between 46 U.S. state attorneys general and the U.S. tobacco industry). For
a theoretical framework that accommodates the case of the FCTC as an international regulatory
response to a policy crisis, see THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION (Walter Mattli & Ngaire
Woods eds., 2009) (discussing how and why "regulatory capture" happens, and how it can be
averted).
38 Working Group Precedingthe IntergovernmentalNegotiating Body on the WHO FCTC
(1999-2000), FCTC: WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, http://www.
who.int/fctc/about/pre neg workinggroup/en/index.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
39 Press Release, Gro Harlem Brundtland, WHO Director-General's Response to the
Tobacco Hearings (Oct. 13, 2000) [hereinafter Brundtland], http://www.who.int/tobacco/fram
ework/public hearings/dghearings en.pdf.
40 World Health Assembly, supra note 30. Philip Morris International (PMI) asserts to its
shareholders that certain provisions of the FCTC Guidelines are "extreme application[s]" of the
FCTC that are "untethered to public health objectives" and may adversely affect their business and
financial position. "[L]imiting tobacco industry involvement in the development of tobacco policy
and regulations, generic packaging, point of sale display bans, a ban on the use of colors in
packaging, and a ban on all forms of communications to adult smokers." PHILIP MORRIS
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 18, at 27. See also PHILIP MORRIS INTERNATIONAL, 2008 ANNUAL
REPORT 28 (2009), available at http://media.corporate-ir.net/media files/irol/14/146476/PMAR2
009.pdf (discussing the growing concerns of public health organization with regard to tar and
nicotine testing and brand descriptors, and emphasizing Philip Morris International's opposition to
any package and descriptive restrictions as unduly restrictive of intellectual property rights,
particularly addressing litigation against Uruguay).
41 Brundtland, supra note 39.
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manufacturing products with fewer contaminants and carcinogens 42 and
developing relatively ineffective alternatives to the FCTC in an explicit
For example, British American
attempt to undermine its development.
Tobacco "launched its so-called 'corporate social responsibility' campaign
with the aim of moving the tobacco industry 'ahead-fast enough and far
enough-of the WHO agenda to negate the need for the [FCTC].' "
Simultaneously, some WHO officials raised concerns about the capability
and capacity of WHO as an organization to be able to effectively administer
the treaty.45
42

id.

43 Stacy M. Carter et al., Destroying Tobacco Control Activism From the Inside, 11

112, 112-18 (2002) (describing a public relations firm's intelligencegathering on the FCTC development process and advice given to PMI on action to delay and
undermine the FCTC). See also Hadii Mamudu et al., Project Cerberus: Tobacco Industry
Strategy to Create an Alternative to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 98:9
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1630, 1630-42 (2008) (discussing the collaboration between BAT, PM,
and JTI to promote a "voluntary global youth smoking prevention" standard "as an alternative
to the FCTC").
TOBACCO CONTROL

4 CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, TOBACCO INDUSTRY PROFILE - LATIN AMERICA 11

(2009), http://www.tobaccofreecenter.org/files/pdfs/en/IWfactscountries_%2OLatinAmerica.pdf
Currently, the leading transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) make broad statements of support
for the FCTC on their corporate websites, while simultaneously promoting non-FCTC compliant
measures such as designated smoking rooms (Article 8) or partial advertising restrictions (Article
13), in addition to openly combating guidelines that threaten existing infrastructure that
accommodates financial and political influence (Article 5.3). ICE. Smith et al., Tobacco Industry
Attempts to Undermine Article 5.3 and "Good Governance" Traps, 18 TOBACCO CONTROL 509
(2009). See generally Regulation ofPublic Place Smoking, PHILIP MORRIS INT'L, http://www.pmi.
com/eng/tobacco-regulation/regulatingjtobacco/pages/public placesmoking.aspx (last visited
Nov. 20, 2010) ("In restaurants, bars, cafes, discos, and other entertainment establishments,
proprietors should be free to decide whether to permit, restrict, or prohibit smoking."). British
American Tobacco's corporate website states:
We believe that governments, employers, the hospitality industry, the tobacco
industry, consumers and others can work together on practical initiatives. These
include providing separate smoking and non-smoking areas and ventilation to
reduce involuntary exposure to second-hand smoke. Air filtration systems can
also make a room more comfortable, although they too cannot completely remove
the smoke.
Public Place Smoking: PracticalInitiatives, BRIT. AMER. TOBACCO, http://www.bat.com/group/
sites/UK _3MNFEN.nsf/vwPagesWebLive/DO6HADSB?opendocument&SKN=1
(last updated
July 5, 2010). See also Banning the Display of Tobacco Products, PHILIP MORRIS INT'L MGMT.
S.A. (PMIMSA), http://www.productdisplayban.com/ (last updated Aug. 13, 2010) ("A small
number of countries have banned the display of tobacco products at the point of sale, arguing this is
a necessary step to prevent people, particularly youth, from smoking.").
45 Roemer et al., supra note 28, at 937 ("Further, there was particular resistance to their
proposal that such a treaty be developed under the auspices of WHO, an organization that had
never in its almost 50-year history utilized its constitutional authority to develop a treaty on
any matter affecting global public health. In a letter to Roemer dated July 28, 1995, a senior
WHO official criticized the Taylor-Roemer proposal as "ambitious to a fault," emphasized
that "it is important to be realistic," and encouraged "revising the outline and preparing the
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Brundtland outlined four interventions for which the evidence showed
effective reduction in the harms caused by tobacco products and advocated a
treaty based on those interventions: (1) prevent youth and non-smokers from
picking up the habit of smoking; (2) encourage smokers to quit; (3) prevent
non-smokers from being exposed to secondhand smoke; and (4) reduce the
levels of harmful constituents in tobacco products.46 These interventions, as
well as price-based policies, provided the backdrop to formal negotiations
opened during the first session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body
comprised of all WHO Member States, regional economic integration
organizations, and observers. The negotiations began on October 16, 2000
and continued through May 21, 2003, when the World Health Assembly
With Turkmenistan's accession on
unanimously adopted the final text.
May 13, 2011, the FCTC reached a total of 173 Parties-over 84% of
eligible Parties-accounting for over 86% of the world's population.48
Like many multilateral treaties, the primary mechanism for monitoring
the conduct of States Parties to the FCTC is a system of periodic national
reporting. The treaty sets forth general guidelines for the content of reports,
which must address measures taken at the national level to implement the
FCTC, constraints or barriers encountered in the course of implementation,
measures taken to overcome such constraints or barriers, and information on
financial and technical assistance provided or received for tobacco control
activities.4 9 States Parties are also required to provide certain types of
information gathered in the course of their implementation efforts.50 The
level of States' compliance with their treaty obligations varies based on their
perceived national interests." "National reporting systems are intended to
background paper."). Brundtland, supra note 39, at 2-3 (detailing the differing positions of
WHO, the Member States, and tobacco companies and the challenges they present for WHO).
46 Brundtland, supra note
39, at 2.
47 An International Treatyfor Tobacco Control, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 12, 2003),
http://www.who.int/features/2003/08/en; Annex 2: History of the WHO FCTC Process,
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ALLIANCE, http://www.fctc.org/index.php?option=comcontent&v
iew-article&id=179&Itemid=179 (last visited Nov. 20,2010) (specifying the beginning of the
nesotiations as October 16, 2000).
WHO, UPDATED STATUS OF THE WHO FCTC: RATIFICATION AND ACCESSION BY
COUNTRY 2 (2009), available at http://www.fctc.org/dmdocuments/ratification-latestBaham
as df; Status of the Convention, supra note 8.
FCTC, supra note 11, art. 21(1)(a)-(c).
50 Id. In practice, the monitoring and evaluation obligations of the treaty have been
coordinated and overseen jointly by the Framework Convention Alliance and the Institute for
Global Tobacco Control at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg of Public Health which issues an annual
report based on the information described above. FCTC Monitoring, JOHNS HOPKINS
BLOOMBERG SCHOOL OF PUB. HEALTH, http://www.jhsph.edu/global tobacco/surveillanceev
aluation/fctc monitoring/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
51 See Asif Efrat, A Theory of InternationallyRegulated Goods, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1466, 1467, 1495-1504 (2009) (arguing that governments which support international trade
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subject governments to public scrutiny with the goal of assisting them in
implementing their international obligations and, where necessary,
,,12
generating moral pressure to comply with applicable norms.
III. INTERPRETING THE FCTC
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice recognizes
the following sources of international law: "international conventions,
whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by
contesting States"; "international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law"; "the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations"; and judicial decisions and teachings of highly qualified publicists.53
As an international convention, the FCTC is subject to customary rules of
treaty interpretation as established under the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (Vienna Convention); 54 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
provides that:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a
treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its
preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made
between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty;

regulation are motivated either by "the trade's negative externalities upon their own countries
(primary externalities) ... [or] on foreign countries (secondary externalities)"); Louis
HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 25-26 (1979) (finding that
international law "always yield to national interest"); see also Mary Assunta & Simon
Chapman, Health Treaty Dilution:A Case Study ofJapan's Influence on the Languageof the
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 60 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY

HEALTH 751, 751-55 (2006) (arguing that the Japanese government's stake in the tobacco
industry caused it to successfully argue for optional language in the FCTC).
52Melissa E. Crow, Smokescreens and State Responsibility: Using Human Rights
Strategies to Promote Global Tobacco Control, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 209, 219 (2004) (citation
omitted).
5 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179.
54 FCTC Revised Chairperson's Protocol, supra note 21, at 3.
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(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by
the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the
context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its
provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the Parties regarding its
interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties.s"
The FCTC is comprised of thirty-eight articles that outline the governing
structure and substantive requirements of an evidence-based approach to
reduce the harms of tobacco consumption. Articles 6 through 17 outline
approaches to reduce both supply of and demand for tobacco.s Article 23 of
the FCTC establishes the COP, which conducts regular sessions not only to
review progress in treaty implementation, but also to make decisions that
facilitate effective implementation.ss The decisions of the COP are reached
by consensus; amendments and protocols can be adopted with a threequarters majority of present voting Parties if consensus cannot be reached.5 9
5 Vienna Convention, supra note 5, at pt. II, § 3, art. 31(1)-(3). Although many countries,
including the United States, have not signed the Vienna Convention, its provisions are widely
regarded as constituting customary international law. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 325 cmt. a (1987) ("[The Vienna Convention] represents
generally accepted principles and the United States has also appeared willing to accept them
despite differences of nuance and emphasis."). But see Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 431, 433-44, 449
(2004) (noting that the United States Supreme Court has never applied the Vienna Convention
as binding U.S. law).
56 FCTC, supra note 11.
51 Id. arts. 6-17.
58 Id. art. 23. See generally Roda Verheyen, The Climate ChangeRegime after Montreal:
Article 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Revisited, 7 Y.B. EUR. ENvTL.
L. 234 (2007) (discussing the relevance of COP decision-making in the context of the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change); Petros C. Mavroidis, No Outsourcing of Law?
WTO Law as Practiced by WTO Courts, 102 Am. J. INT'L L. 421 (2008) (discussing the
relevance of COP decision-making in the context of the WTO).
59 FCTC, supranote 11, art. 28.

THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE FCTC GUIDELINES

2010]

135

Authority for the COP to issue guidelines is found in both Article 5.4,
which outlines a general requirement that Parties cooperate with respect to
the formation of procedures and guidelines, and Article 7, which specifically
requires the COP to issue guidelines as to non-price measures for reducing
tobacco consumption.60 The COP adopted guidelines for Articles 5.3, 8, 11,
and 13 unanimously. 61 Thus, there is little question that they constitute a
"subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
61
treaty or the application of its provisions" under the Vienna Convention.
As the WHO Legal Counsel concluded with respect to the inclusion of key
inputs and manufacturing equipment as relevant for combating illicit trade,
"[d]ecisions of the Conference of the Parties, as the supreme body
comprising all Parties to the FCTC, undoubtedly represent a 'subsequent
agreement between the Parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty', as
stated in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention." 63 Parties must therefore
interpret treaty provisions in light of the guidelines as part of their good-faith
obligation regarding treaty compliance.
Together with context, the guidelines are appropriately used to ascertain
the meaning of treaty terms, although they must be given an ordinary
reading. The ordinary meaning of the majority of the guidelines' language
suggests that they are not intended to have binding legal effect as
60

Id. art. 7.

61 WHO, WHO's FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL . .. SAVING
LIVES 1

(2010), available at http://www.emro.who.int/tfi/wntd2011/pdf/1%20WNTD%202011 %20F
CTC%20ENGLISH.pdf ("Five guidelines have been unanimously adopted for Articles 5.3, 8,
11, 12, 13 and 14; partial guidelines for Articles 9 and 10 have also been adopted.").
62 Whether consensus documents made pursuant to an international treaty achieve status as
a "subsequent agreement" under Vienna Convention 31(3) vary widely depending on the
nature of the treaty and its organizational structure. See Burrus M. Carnahan, Treaty Review
Conferences, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 226, 229 (1987) (discussing that a final declaration of a treaty
review conference would likely fit the Vienna Convention's definition of subsequent
agreement or subsequent practice); Claire R. Kelly, Power,Linkage and Accommodation: The
WTO as an InternationalActor and its Influence on other Actors andRegimes, 24 BERKELEY
J. INT'L L. 79, 125 (2006) (stating that under Vienna Convention Article 30, should a later
protocol contradict a previously signed treaty, the treaty should control); Patricia Hewitson,
Nonproliferation and Reduction of Nuclear Weapons: Risks of Weakening the Multilateral
Nuclear Nonproliferation Norm, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 405, 485 (2003) (noting that
consensus

documents

from Non-Proliferation Treaty

Review

Conferences "constitute

'subsequent agreement' and/or 'subsequent practice' by parties," and so fall under article
31(3) of the Vienna Convention as considered binding on the treaty signatories). But see
Christopher A. Ford, U.S. Special Rep. for Nuclear Nonproliferation, NPT on Trial: How
Should We Respond to the Challenges of Maintainingand Strengtheningthe Treaty Regime?,
Remarks to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and the Center for the Promotion of
Disarmament and Nonproliferation (Feb. 6, 2007), http://www.mtholyoke.edulacadlintrell
Iran/trial.htm (stating that political consensus documents "do not themselves have any legal
imxort" and would not fall under Vienna Convention Article 31(3)).
FCTC Revised Chairperson's Protocol, supra note 21, at 5.
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international law.64 While the guidelines as to each FCTC Article are not of
uniform length and contain important differences (Article 8 is the shortest,
while Article 13 is the most extensive), some language applicable to all
guidelines either implies or states explicitly that they are "principles and
recommendations to assist Parties in best practice implementation of their
treaty obligations," as opposed to binding obligations.65
The purpose, scope, and applicability of the guidelines variously declare
that States "should," "should consider," "should endeavour," "should
ensure," and "should require" the measures adopted by the COP. 66 The text
of the FCTC uses the word "shall" as to certain of Parties' obligations. 67 The
use of the word "should," in most contexts, is "precatory, not mandatory."68
Yet the word "should" may also be used to express a duty or obligation albeit
with a degree of flexibility or discretion. 69 FCTC Article 11.1(b)(iv)
illustrates this distinction, requiring that warnings and messages "should be
50% or more of the principal display areas but shall be no less than 30% of
the principal display areas."70 Furthermore, many of the measures adopted
without objection by the COP are styled "recommendations," the ordinary
meaning of which does not entail mandatory action. 7 1 In the following
sections, the treaty language is juxtaposed with key language from the
guidelines in an effort to sort out obligations imposed by the treaty language,
obligations clarified by virtue of guidance from the guidelines, and nonobligatory provisions of the guidelines that are precatory or
recommendatory.7 2

6 See FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ALLIANCE, supra note 19, at 6 (coupling the language
issued by the FCA in its publication, "Hold Your Government Accountable," with the
guidelines to present the "highest attainable standard of health").
6s Id. at 3.
66 FCTC, supra note 11.
67 Id.

68 United States v. Rogers, 14 Fed. Appx. 303, 305 (6th Cir. 2001). See also Carlos
M.
Vasquez, Breard,Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1317, 1339 n.75 (1999)
(" O]ften treaties express broad aspirations in precatory terms.").
See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1211 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(Hawkins, J., dissenting) ("The word 'should' is used 'to express a duty [or] obligation.' "
(citing THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTION AND LANGUAGE GUIDE 931 (1999))); Alex
Glashausser, What We Must Never Forget When It Is a Treaty We Are Expounding, 73 U. CIN.
L. REv. 1243, 1319 (2005) (noting that treaties are not amenable to using dictionary
definitions of terms, especially precatory and mandatory words).
70 FCTC, supra note 11, at 10.
71 Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in
MultilateralEnvironmental Agreements: A Little-NoticedPhenomenon in InternationalLaw,
94 AM. J. INT'L L. 623, 643 (2000) (drawing a distinction between "unanimous" and "adopted
by consensus").
72 Because this Article is intended for both expert and novice audiences, the guidelines will
be described with sufficient generality to appropriately fit within the proffered analytical
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A. Article 5: General Obligations(Tobacco Industry Interference)
World Health Assembly Resolution WHA54.18 on transparency in
tobacco control, citing the findings of the Committee of Experts on Tobacco
Industry Documents, states that "the tobacco industry has operated for years
with the express intention of subverting the role of governments and of
WHO in implementing public health policies to combat the tobacco
epidemic.""
The literature documenting the tobacco industry's efforts to limit
governments' measures on tobacco control is vast and growing.74 The
release of tobacco industry documents as a result of litigation in the United
States showed that those efforts included, inter alia, developing selfregulatory guidelines as alternatives to legislation, presenting false
information to regulators known to be false at the time of presentation,
secretly funding ostensibly independent scientific authorities, attempting to
draft weak legislation, and influencing law makers through direct and
indirect lobbying.7 5

framework without simply repeating the full text. References for the full text will be provided
throughout the footnotes.
7 WHO, Transparencyin Tobacco Control, WHA54.18, available at http://www.who.int/t
obacco/framework/wha eb/wha5418/en/index.html. The scale and intensity of the tobacco
industry's effort to discredit the World Health Organization is an important episode in
understanding tobacco industry efforts to influence the public health debate on tobacco
consumption. Coordinated tobacco industry efforts to secretly purchase the opinions of
international and scientific authorities are well-known, but the industry also, inter alia,
employed former WHO officials and promised to employ then-current WHO employees;
directed philanthropic contributions-funded non-tobacco related WHO efforts-specifically
to "penetrate the bureaucratic structure of WHO"; campaigned the World Bank, the U.N.
Food and Agricultural Organization, and the International Labour Organization to issue
reports hostile to WHO tobacco-related activities; misrepresented tobacco-industry funded
scientific conferences as sponsored by the WHO; and, used affiliated food production
companies and subsidiaries as "neutral ground" to lobby against activities they viewed as
threatening to expansion of tobacco production, manufacturing and consumption. World
Health Organization, Report of the Committee of Experts on Tobacco Industry Documents:
Tobacco Companies' Strategies to Undermine Tobacco Control Activities, at 38-39 (June
2000), availableat http://www.who.int/tobacco/media/en/who inquiry.pdf
7 Hard copy documents reside in document depositories near Guildford, UK and in
Minnesota, U.S.-containing a total of approximately sixty million pages of documents and
thousands of audio and video materials, the majority of which are now on-line at the Legacy
Tobacco Documents Library located at the University of California at San Francisco. A
Digital Library of Tobacco Documents, UNIV. CAL., S.F.: LEGACY TOBACCO DOCUMENTS
LIBRARY, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edul (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
7s M. Assunta & S. Chapman, A Mire of Highly Subjective and Ineffective Voluntary
Guidelines: Tobacco Industry Efforts to Thwart Tobacco Control in Malaysia, 13 TOBACCO
CONTROL 43, 43-50 (2004); WHO: TOBACCO FREE INITIATIVE FOR A TOBACCO FREE FUTURE,
TOBACCO INDUSTRY INTERFERENCE WITH TOBACCO CONTROL 10-11, 15 (2008), available at
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As part of the strategies advocated for reducing tobacco industry
interference in setting public health policy, Article 5.3 of the FCTC requires
that, "[i]n setting and implementing their public health policies with respect
to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect these policies from commercial
and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national
law."76 The Article 5.3 guidelines outline specific "activities [that] are
recommended for addressing tobacco industry interference . . 7 These
activities include: limiting interactions between tobacco industry and
government representatives; ensuring the transparency of any interactions
that do occur; avoiding conflicts of interest between government officials
and the tobacco industry; refusing to accept voluntary codes of conduct in
place of enforceable laws; de-normalizing the tobacco industry or regulating
the activities undertaken by the industry as party of "corporate social
responsibility"; and, where the State has an ownership interest in a tobacco
78
company, treating it as any other regulated enterprise.
Article 5.3 provides governments substantial flexibility in meeting this
obligation as the level of protection required is left to existing processes for
establishing national law, e.g., passage of legislation, review and
interpretation by national courts, and administrative regulations issued under
Similarly, the guidelines are conditioned on the
executive authority.
discretion afforded national governments in setting tobacco control policy"Without prejudice to the sovereign right of the Parties to determine and
establish their tobacco control policies, Parties are encouraged to implement
[guidelines to Articles 5.3] to the extent possible in accordance with their
national law."80 Moreover, it is the aim of the Article 5.3 guidelines to
"assist Parties in meeting their legal obligations under Article 5.3 of the
Convention."8 1
The Article 5.3 guidelines, at least impliedly, represent a high standard for
treaty compliance. "While the measures recommended in these guidelines
should be applied by Parties as broadly as necessary, in orderbest to achieve
the objectives of Article 5.3 of the Convention, Parties are strongly urged to

http://www.who.int/tobacco/resources/publications/Tobacco%20Industry/ 20lnterference-F NA
L. df.
FCTC, GuidelinesforImplementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO FrameworkConvention
on Tobacco Control on the Protection of Public Health Policies with Respect to Tobacco
Controlfrom Commercialand Other Vested Interests of the Tobacco Industries,para. 3 (Nov.
22, 2008) [hereinafter GuidelinesforImplementation: Art. 5.3], availableat http://www.who.
int/fctc/guidelines/article_5_3.pdf.
7 Id. para. 17 (emphasis added).
78 Id. para. 17(1)-(8).
See id. para. 3 (encouraging protection of policies through national law).
80 Id
81 Id. para. 8.
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implement measures beyond those recommended in these guidelines when
adapting them to their specific circumstances."8 2
The guidelines to Article 5.3 conclude with the statement that the COP
reserves the right to consider elaborating a protocol-as provided under
FCTC Article 33-for Article 5.3." That the COP reserved the right to
establish a protocol is itself not evidence of any obligation with respect to
Article 5.3. It might mean that the matter is of sufficient urgency to require
an additional protocol (as is the case for Article 15 on illicit trade in tobacco
products); that Parties could not reach an agreement on an issue located so
close to issues of national sovereignty; or that the call for an additional
protocol diminishes the weight that should be given to the Article 5.3
guidelines because they are merely recommendatory short of an additional
protocol.
The Article 5.3 guidelines also contain language that would ordinarily be
understood to express a duty or obligation. This includes language that not
only specifically addresses an obligation found within the treaty, e.g.,
"comprehensive" national tobacco control strategies, but also obligations
modified by use of the word "should," which may be understood to impose
an obligation with some discretion afforded to the implementing
government:
7. The purpose of these guidelines is to ensure that efforts to
protect tobacco control from commercial and other vested
interests of the tobacco industry are comprehensive and
effective. Parties should implement measures in all branches
of government that may have an interest in, or the capacity to,
affect public health policies with respect to tobacco control....
9. The guidelines apply to setting and implementing Parties'
public health policies with respect to tobacco control. They
also apply to persons, bodies or entities that contribute to, or
could contribute to, the formulation, implementation,
administration or enforcement of those policies.
10. The guidelines are applicable to government officials,
representatives and employees of any national, state,
provincial, municipal, local or other public or semi/quasipublic institution or body within the jurisdiction of a Party, and
to any person acting on their behalf. Any government branch

82 Id. para. 12 (emphasis added).
83

See id para. 39 (discussing the COP's consideration of the need to establish a protocol).
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(executive, legislative and judiciary) responsible for setting and
implementing tobacco control policies and for protecting those
policies against tobacco industry interests should be

accountable. 84
Thus, the Article 5.3 guidelines, under the ordinary meaning of the terms,
set forth an aspirational standard for compliance with treaty obligations and
are explicitly conditioned on the sovereignty of the Parties. Yet Article 5.3 is
specified as an area of sufficient priority to warrant a separate protocol
concluded under Article 33. Moreover, the language within the guidelines
may give rise to some obligations including the organizations and agents of a
government to which it is applicable and the standard it sets for measuring a
"comprehensive" national tobacco control strategy under FCTC Article 5.
B. Article 8: Protectionfrom Exposure to Tobacco Smoke
In June 2006, U.S. Surgeon General Richard Carmona stated, "[T]he
debate is over. The science is clear: secondhand smoke is not a mere
annoyance, but a serious health hazard that causes premature death and
disease in children and nonsmoking adults."8 Tobacco smoke contains at
least fifty carcinogens and is a proven cause of lung cancer, heart disease,
respiratory illnesses such as bronchitis and asthma, low birth weight, and
sudden infant death syndrome. A 2009 report released by the U.S. Institute
of Medicine reviewing eleven studies from the U.S., Canada, and Scotland
on the relationship between smoke-free laws and cardiovascular disease
concluded that secondhand smoke causes heart attacks while smoke-free
laws prevent them.

Id. paras. 7, 9-10.
85 Notwithstanding the establishment of a binding legal obligation, the "enforceability" of a
treaty is dependent upon the domestic legal systems and which actors are empowered to bring
a claim based on a treaty. Moreover, States can, and do, ignore obligations imposed under
international law.
86 Richard H. Carmona, U.S. Surgeon Gen., The Health Effects of Secondhand Smoke,
Remarks at Press Conference to Launch Health Consequences of Involuntary Exposure to
Tobacco Smoke (June 27, 2006), availableat http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/news/speeches/
06272006a.html.
87 id
88 INST. MED. NAT'L ACAD.: COMM. ON SECONDHAND SMOKE EXPOSURE & ACUTE
CORONARY EVENTS, SECONDHAND SMOKE EXPOSURE AND CARDIOVASCULAR EFFECTS:
MAKING SENSE OF THE EVIDENCE 18-21 (2010). See also J.E. Callinan et al., Legislative
Smoking Bans for Reducing Secondhand Smoke Exposure, Smoking Prevalence and Tobacco
Consumption, 6 COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS 1, 1-126 (2010) (addressing
legislative means for reducing the health effects of secondhand smoke).
84
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The FCTC obligates States Parties to undertake appropriate initiatives to
protect present and future generations from the health, social, environmental,
and economic consequences of tobacco consumption and exposure to
secondhand smoke.89 Establishing smoke-free public places is the first of the
demand-reduction obligations imposed by the FCTC and has arguably
exerted the most significant influence on public health policy in both
developed and developing countries. 90 The Article 8 guidelines uniquely
make an explicit association between effective implementation and the
fulfillment of other obligations imposed on States under international human
rights law, while also clearly defining obligatory terms in the treaty;
"effective measure" is defined as 100% smoke-free air in the guidelines. 9'
This section discusses not only the treaty text and guidelines, but also the
specific human rights affected by exposure to tobacco smoke.
The treaty text provides that:
1. Parties recognize that scientific evidence has unequivocally
established that exposure to tobacco smoke causes death,
disease and disability.
2. Each Party shall adopt and implement in areas of existing
national jurisdiction as determined by national law and actively
promote at other jurisdictional levels the adoption and
executive,
legislative,
effective
of
implementation
administrative and/or other measures, providing for protection
from exposure to tobacco smoke in indoor workplaces, public
transport, indoor public places and, as appropriate, other public
places.92
The Article 8 guidelines address the importance of protecting people from
exposure to tobacco smoke. It is the aim of the Article 8 guidelines to "assist
Parties in meeting their obligations under Article 8 of the Convention." 9 3

89 FCTC, supra note 11, art. 3.
90 Smoke-free Areas, TOBACCO ATLAS, http://tobaccoatlas.org/smokefreeareas.html

(last
visited Nov. 20, 2010). A growing number of countries have passed smoke-free laws,
including Bhutan, Chad, Colombia, Djibouti, Guatemala, Guinea, Iceland, Iran, Ireland,
Lithuania, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Turkey, Tuvalu, the
United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Zambia. All Canadian provinces/territories and Australian
states/territories have also enacted such laws. Id.; WHO, TUVALU: WESTERN PAC. REGION
406-07 (2002), availableat http://www.who.int/tobacco/media/en/Tuvalu.pdf.
91 WHO Guidelines, supra note 25, para. 16.
92 FCTC, supra note 11, art. 8.
9 WHO Guidelines, supra note 25, para. 1.
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The Article 8 guidelines contain conditional language as well as
mandatory obligations: "Parties are encouraged to use these guidelines not
only to fulfil their legal duties under the Convention, but also to follow best
practices in protecting public health." 9 4 The Article 8 guidelines provide in
pertinent part:
3. These guidelines have two related objectives. The first is to
assist Parties in meeting their obligations under Article 8 of the
WHO Framework Convention, in a manner consistent with the
scientific evidence regarding exposure to second-hand tobacco
smoke and the best practice worldwide in the implementation
of smoke free measures, in order to establish a high standard of
accountability for treaty compliance and to assist the Parties in
promoting the highest attainable standard of health. The
second objective is to identiy the key elements of legislation
necessary to effectively protect people from exposure to
tobacco smoke, as requiredby Article 8.95
On the one hand, paragraph 3 suggests that the guidelines represent an
aspirational standard, "best practice" for treaty implementation. On the other
hand, the second sentence of paragraph 3 states specifically that the
guidelines identify the necessary elements of smoke-free legislation as
required by Article 8. Applying Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention
to the Article 8 guidelines, the most reasonable conclusion is that any
paragraphs that identify "elements" of legislation necessary to protect people
from tobacco smoke constitute required action under the treaty-as well as
international human rights law-except where discretion is permitted. 96
For example, paragraph 16 states that "smoke free air" is air that is 100%
smoke-free, while paragraph 18 concedes that "the precise definition of
Paragraphs 13
'public places' will vary between jurisdictions . . ..
through 27 outline the "key elements of legislation necessary to effectively
protect people" from tobacco smoke.
Definitions
13. In developing legislation, it is important to use care in
defining key terms. Several recommendations as to appropriate
94 Id. para. 2.

9 Id. para. 3 (emphasis added).
96 Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 31(3)(a); FCTC, supra note 11, art. 8.
97 WHO Guidelines, supra note 25, paras. 16, 18.
98 Id paras. 3, 13-27.
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definitions, based on experiences in many countries, are set out
here ....

"Second-hand tobacco smoke" or "environmental tobacco
smoke"
14. Several alternative terms are commonly used to describe
the type of smoke addressed by Article 8 of the WHO
Framework Convention. These include "second-hand smoke",
"environmental tobacco smoke", and "other people's smoke".
Terms such as "passive smoking" and "involuntary exposure to
tobacco smoke" should be avoided, as experience in France
and elsewhere suggests that the tobacco industry may use these
terms to support a position that "voluntary" exposure is
"Second-hand tobacco smoke", sometimes
acceptable.
abbreviated as "SHS", and "environmental tobacco smoke",
sometimes abbreviated "ETS", are the preferable terms; these
guidelines use "second-hand tobacco smoke."
15. Second-hand tobacco smoke can be defined as "the smoke
emitted from the burning end of a cigarette or from other
tobacco products usually in combination with the smoke
exhaled by the smoker."
16. "Smoke free air" is air that is 100% smoke free. This
definition includes, but is not limited to, air in which tobacco
smoke cannot be seen, smelled, sensed or measured. 99
"Smoking"
17. This term should be defined to include being in possession
or control of a lit tobacco product regardless of whether the
smoke is being actively inhaled or exhaled.
"Public places"
18. While the precise definition of "public places" will vary
between jurisdictions, it is important that legislation define this
term as broadly as possible. The definition used should cover
99 "It is possible that constituent elements of tobacco smoke may exist in air in amounts too
small to be measured. Attention should be given to the possibility that the tobacco industry or
the hospitality sector may attempt to exploit the limitations of this definition." Id. at 3 n. 1.
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all places accessible to the general public or places for
collective use, regardless of ownership or right to access.
"Indoor" or "enclosed"
19. Article 8 requires protection from tobacco smoke in
"indoor" workplaces and public places. Because there are
potential pitfalls in defining "indoor" areas, the experiences of
various countries in defining this term should be specifically
examined. The definition should be as inclusive and as clear as
possible, and care should be taken in the definition to avoid
creating lists that may be interpreted as excluding potentially
relevant "indoor" areas. It is recommended that "indoor" (or
"enclosed") areas be defined to include any space covered by a
roof or enclosed by one or more walls or sides, regardless of
the type of material used for the roof, wall or sides, and
regardless of whether the structure is permanent or temporary.
"Workplace"
20. A "workplace" should be defined broadly as "any place
used by people during their employment or work." This should
include not only work done for compensation, but also
voluntary work, if it is of the type for which compensation is
normally paid. In addition, "workplaces" include not only
those places at which work is performed, but also all attached
or associated places commonly used by the workers in the
course of their employment, including, for example, corridors,
lifts, stairwells, lobbies, joint facilities, cafeterias, toilets,
lounges, lunchrooms and also outbuildings such as sheds and
huts. Vehicles used in the course of work are workplaces and
should be specifically identified as such.
21. Careful consideration should be given to workplaces that
are also individuals' homes or dwelling places, for example,
prisons, mental health institutions or nursing homes. These
places also constitute workplaces for others, who should be
protected from exposure to tobacco smoke.
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"Public transport"
22. Public transport should be defined to include any vehicle
used for the carriage of members of the public, usually for
reward or commercial gain. This would include taxis.
THE SCOPE OF EFFECTIVE LEGISLATION
23. Article 8 requires the adoption of effective measures to
protect people from exposure to tobacco smoke in (1) indoor
workplaces, (2) indoor public places, (3) public transport, and
(4) "as appropriate" in "other public places."' 00
Paragraph 24 is specific as to the obligation upon Parties to create 100%
smoke-free environments:
24. This creates an obligation to provide universal protection
by ensuring that all indoor public places, all indoor workplaces,
all public transport and possibly other (outdoor or quasioutdoor) public places are free from exposure to second-hand
tobacco smoke. No exemptions are justified on the basis of
health or law arguments. If exemptions must be considered on
the basis of other arguments, these should be minimal. In
addition, if a Party is unable to achieve universal coverage
immediately, Article 8 creates a continuing obligation to move
as quickly as possible to remove any exemptions and make the
protection universal. Each Party should strive to provide
universal protection within five years of the WHO Framework
Convention's entry into force for that Party.'0 '
Similarly, paragraph 6 provides unequivocally that:
Effective measures to provide protection from exposure to
tobacco smoke, as envisioned by Article 8 of the WHO
Framework Convention, require the total elimination of
smoking and tobacco smoke in a particular space or
environment in order to create a 100% smoke-free
environment.'02
100 Id. paras. 13-23. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing WHO tobacco
industry efforts).
101 WHO Guidelines, supra note 25, para. 24.
102 Id. para.
6.
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The remaining guidelines specifying aspects of legislation
necessary to protect people from tobacco smoke state that:
25. No safe levels of exposure to second-hand smoke exist, and, as
previously acknowledged by the Conference of the Parties in decision
FCTC/COPl(15), engineering approaches, such as ventilation, air
exchange and the use of designated smoking areas, do not protect
against exposure to tobacco smoke.
26. Protection should be provided in all indoor or enclosed
workplaces, including motor vehicles used as places of work (for
example, taxis, ambulances or delivery vehicles).
27. The language of the treaty requires protective measures not only in
all "indoor" public places, but also in those "other" (that is, outdoor or
quasi-outdoor) public places where "appropriate". In identifying
those outdoor and quasi-outdoor public places where legislation is
appropriate, Parties should consider the evidence as to the possible
health hazards in various settings and should act to adopt the most
effective protection against exposure wherever the evidence shows
that a hazard exists. 0 3
The remaining guidelines are qualified by stating that Parties "should"
undertake certain measures related to involving the public in smoke-free
efforts, compliance and enforcement and monitoring and evaluation. For the
latter category in particular, the guidelines impose only a broad suggestion
necessarily limited by "available expertise and resources."l 04
Paragraphs 28 through 30 focus on public awareness campaigns and the
involvement of the civil community. The guidelines note that the effects of
second-hand smoke need to be disseminated and outline the key stakeholders
in this respect such as businesses, restaurants, and hospitality associations. 0 5
The Article 8 guidelines urge legislation to impose liability primarily on two
stakeholders-business establishments and individual smokers. o0 However,
the duties to be imposed on them are couched in discretionary terms.
Similarly, penalties set aside for violations of the duties are left to the
discretion of the Parties to adjudge according to the idiosyncrasies of the
customary and legal environment of each individual country. Penalties
103Id. paras. 25-27.
'0

Id. para. 47.

os Id. paras. 28-30.
106 Id para.
31.
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should "deter violations or else they may be ignored by violators or treated as
mere costs of doing business."10 7 The guidelines leave it to each State Party
whether or not to impose administrative and criminal sanctions over and
above monetary sanctions according to the "country's legal and cultural
context."' 08
Article 8 imposes a continuing obligation on the States Parties to make
protection universal by doing away with any exemptions under domestic law
and encourages States to fulfill their obligations within five years of
accession or ratification.' 09 The five-year time limit is recommended
because insufficient resources may delay the establishment and
implementation of 100% smoke-free public places.110 Developing countries,
for example, may face this limitation, although the guidelines are clear that
implementation can often be accomplished inexpensively. 1 '
The "key elements of legislation necessary to effectively protect people
from exposure to tobacco smoke" represent the strongest obligatory language
within any of the guidelines,1 2 although Parties may still resist
implementation on the basis that the guidelines represent "best practice" and
certain elements of recommended national legislation like "public places"
provide significant discretion to national law-making authorities. 1 3
1. InternationalHuman Rights Law
Uniquely, the Article 8 guidelines emphasize the relationship between
smoke-free public places and human rights, declaring, "The duty to protect
from tobacco smoke, embodied in the text of Article 8, is grounded in
fundamental human rights and freedoms."ll 4 Paragraph 4(b) imposes a
legislative duty on Member States, mandating, "The duty to protect
individuals from tobacco smoke corresponds to an obligation by
governments to enact legislation to protect individuals against threats to their
fundamental rights and freedoms.""s

107 Id. para. 32.
08

109
110

Id para. 34.
Id. para. 24.
Id.

n1 Id para. 39.
112

Id para. 3.

Id. paras. 2, 18.
Id. para. 4(a). By contrast, the only rights referred to in the Article 5.3 and thirteen
guidelines are sovereign rights, although the right to free expression and speech is implied in
the latter. Article 11 refers to the "principle that every person should be informed...
Guidelinesfor Implementation: Arts. 5.3, 8, 11, 13, supra note 13, at 33.
"5 WHO Guidelines, supra note 25, para. 4(b).
113
14
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The guidelines explicitly mention that the duty to protect from secondhand smoke is derived from, among other rights, the right to life and the right
to the highest attainable standard of health' 16 identified in the Constitution of
the World Health Organization, the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). For FCTC Parties that have also ratified these
instruments, failure to protect citizens from tobacco smoke constitutes a
violation of their human rights."' 7 While the FCTC is not itself a human
rights treaty, its explicit connection with certain human rights instruments
may give it an iterative role in the fulfillment of human rights treaties (i.e.,
while the FCTC does not impose an obligation for States Parties to provide
citizens the highest attainable standard of health (as does the ICESCR), it can
inform the content of that human right).
For example, as a legally binding international convention, ratifying
States are legally bound to ensure that children can enjoy all of the rights
guaranteed under the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, including
the right to the highest attainable standard of health and, more specifically,
protection from the harms of tobacco."' The U.N. Committee on the Rights
116 See, e.g., Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women:
105, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/38 (Oct. 12, 2000) (expressing
Kazakhstan,
concern about the status of women's health, including their increasing use of tobacco); U.N.
Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest
Attainable Standard of Health, $ 15, 51, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000)
[hereinafter General Comment 14] (recommending that States Parties recognize the right to
health by undertaking information campaigns regarding the adverse consequences of cigarette
smoking and by discouraging the use of tobacco); Concluding Observations of the Committee
on the Rights of the Child: South Africa, t 31, 23d Sess., 615th mtg., U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.122 (Feb. 22, 2000) (expressing concern about the limited availability of
programs, services, and the lack of adequate data in the area of adolescent health, including
tobacco use).
117 See generally Robin Appleberry, Breaking the Camel's Back: Bringing Women's Human
Rights to Bear on Tobacco Control, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM

71, 84-88

(2001)

(characterizing governments' failures to prevent tobacco-related deaths and to provide regular
health screenings for female tobacco users and gender-specific treatment for tobacco-related
diseases as violations of women's human rights); Lucien J. Dhooge, Smoke Across the
Waters: Tobacco Production and Exportation as InternationalHuman Rights Violations, 22
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 355, 414-24 (1998) (arguing that the U.S. government's subsidization
and exportation of tobacco products is inconsistent with the rights to life and health); Jonathan
Wike, The Marlboro Man in Asia: US. Tobacco and Human Rights, 29 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L
L. 329, 351-52 (1996) (characterizing the promotion of tobacco consumption as a violation of
the right to health). The interesting point is not necessarily what the obligation would be
under the ICESCR, but whether the two treaties, when read together, create higher obligations
than each would individually.
118 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Guidelines Regarding the Form and
Contents of PeriodicReports to be Submitted by States Parties under Art. 44, Para. 1(6), of
the Convention, 1 157, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/58 (Nov. 20, 1996). States that have ratified,
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of the Child has also made general recommendations regarding the need for
more effective tobacco information campaigns and the importance of tobacco
advertising restrictions, as detailed in the guidelines issued pursuant to
Articles 11 and 13.119
Pursuant to Article 12(1) of the ICESCR, States Parties "recognize the
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health."1 2 0 Article 12(2) sets forth a number of
affirmative steps to be taken by States Parties to achieve the full realization
of the right to health, including, in relevant part, provisions for the reduction
of the stillbirth rate and of infant mortality, the healthy development of the
child, the improvement of environmental and industrial hygiene, and the
prevention, treatment, and control of epidemic and occupational diseases.
The ICESCR construes Article 12 to require States Parties to implement
certain tobacco control measures, which are referenced in General Comment
14.122 The ICESCR also specifies that a State Party's obligation to improve
environmental and industrial hygiene includes discouraging the "use of
tobacco, drugs and other harmful substances." 23 In addition, General
Comment 14 provides that a State Party's failure to take all necessary
measures to safeguard persons within its jurisdiction from infringements of
the right to health by third parties, including commercial entities, constitutes
a violation of its Article 12 obligations. 124
The U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights'
(UNCESCR) proceedings has regularly addressed tobacco control. Some
governments discuss their tobacco control policies in the periodic reports
issued to the UNCESCR Committee.125 In addition, UNCESCR members
acceded, or succeeded to the Convention on the Rights of the Child can be found at the
following website: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=I
V-1 1&chapter=4&lang=en.
119U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 4: Adolescent Health and
Development in the Context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 10, U.N. Doc.
CRC/GC/2003/4 (July 1, 2003).
120 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR], availableat http://www2.ohchr.org/English/law/cescr.htm.
121 Id. Similarly, Article 7(b) of the ICESCR guarantees the right to the enjoyment of safe
and healthy working conditions. Id.
122 See General Comment 14, supra note 116 (noting that these measures include undertaking
information campaigns regarding the adverse consequences of cigarette smoking and by
discouraging the use of tobacco). In particular, States Parties are encouraged to recognize the
right to health in their national political and legal systems by undertaking "information
campaigns, in particular with respect to . .. the use of cigarettes, drugs and other harmful
substances." Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, Summary
Record of the 16th
Meeting, T$ 4, 32, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/SR.16 (May 10, 1999) (highlighting that due to a
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have used constructive dialogue sessions to question certain government
representatives about the status of particular tobacco control initiatives. 126
Following its sessions, the UNCESCR has issued recommendations
regarding the need for more effective tobacco information campaigns and the
For example, the
importance of tobacco advertising restrictions.12 '
Committee recently reviewed Brazil's periodic report:
30.
The Committee notes with concern that it is still
permissible to promote the use of tobacco through advertising
in the State party and that, while the use of tobacco-derived
products is banned in publicly accessible areas, smoking is
permitted in areas specially designed for the purpose. The
Committee notes, however, that the State party has taken
important steps to reduce the threat tobacco poses for life,
health, the environment and the general population by ratifying
the World Health Organization's Framework Convention on

WHO report listing tobacco products as the "single most important factor of the disease
burden facing Ireland," the Irish government instituted a national tobacco control strategy
including health education programs, increased cigarette taxes, and tougher advertising
restrictions); U. N. Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, Report ofArmenia--Addendum
to Initial Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant,
152, U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.36 (Mar. 8, 1998) (citing provisions of Armenian law that
prohibit minors from working in the tobacco industry or other employment that may harm
their health or physical or mental development); U. N. Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural
Rights, Report of Honduras--Addendum to Initial Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, 201, 394, U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.40 (July 17, 1998)
(asserting increased prevalence of health problems connected with the use and abuse of
tobacco, and noting that the constitution calls for regulation by law of the commercial
advertising of tobacco products); U. N. Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, Report of
Switzerland--Addendum to Initial Reports Submitted by States PartiesReports Under Articles
16 and 17 of the Covenant, 610, U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.33 (Sept. 18, 1996) (noting that
the belief of both the Federal Council and the Federal Office of Public Health that smoking is
harmful to its citizens' health has led to an increase in tobacco warning labels and the
implementation of a comprehensive smoking prevention program).
See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, Summary Record on the 8th
Meeting: Italy, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/SR.8 (May 3, 2000) (discussing Italy's anti-smoking
campaigns and justification for advertising Marlboro tobacco brand on Ferrari cars in Formula
1 racing competition, which was broadcast widely on Italian television, in light of tobacco
advertising ban).
127 See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations:
Ukraine, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.65 (Sept. 24, 2001) (recommending that the Ukrainian
government provide children with accurate and objective information about tobacco use and
discourage public mass media from promoting consumption of tobacco products); U.N.
Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations: Poland, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/l/Add.26 (June 16, 1998) (recommending that the Polish government engage in a
large-scale public information campaign to combat smoking).
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Tobacco Control and developing public policies to reduce
tobacco use. (art. 12, para. 1).
The Committee recommends that the State party take measures
to ban the promotion of tobacco products and enact legislation
to ensure that all enclosed public environments are completely
free of tobacco.128
Because economic, social, and cultural rights can be expensive, the treaty
imposes only a duty of "progressive realization" of some rights dependent on
the availability of resources in various countries.12 9 The Article 8 guidelines
acknowledge this aspect of duties imposed under both the FCTC and the
ICESCR, as to certain affirmative recommendations for enforcement.130
However, establishing smoke-free places often results in "self-enforcement,"
as the public demands a clean working and public environment, and existing
inspection regimes often accommodate enforcement.1
2. National Constitutions
In addition to the obligation to effectively implement the Article 8
guidelines for States that have ratified the major international human rights
treaties, the Article 8 guidelines refer to the "right to life and the right to the
highest attainable standard of health . .. as recognized in the constitutions of
many nations." 32 In some countries, courts have explicitly read the
obligation to protect citizens from tobacco smoke as part of the constitutional
right to life, right to clean environment, and/or right to health. In Uganda,
The Environmental Action Network successfully sued the Attorney General
and the National Environment Management Authority for failure to issue
regulations mandating smoke-free public places.133 In its decision, the High

U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations: Brazil, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/BRA/CO/2 (June 12, 2009).
129 ICESCR, supra note 120, art. 2,
para. 1.
130 WHO Guidelines, supra note 25, paras.
2, 31.
131 Indeed, since the FCTC imposes an immediate obligation to protect citizens
from tobacco
smoke, it probably accelerates the timeline for 'progressive realization' under the ICESCR.
That is, the fact that the FCTC views protection from tobacco smoke as a present obligation
suggests that under the ICESCR it is now time to assure the right and not some time in the
distant future. Also, because the duty does not require the expenditure of considerable
resources, it might also be argued to be presently realizable.
132 WHO Guidelines, supra note 25,
para. 4(a).
133 See Envtl. Action Network, Ltd. (TEAN) v. Att'y Gen. & Nat. Env't Mgmt.
Auth. (NEMA),
No. 39, High Court of Uganda at Kampala (2001) [hereinafter TEAN v. Atty Gen. & NEMA],
available at http://greenwatch.or.ug/pdf/judgements/TEAN%20Versus%20A.G %20&%20NEM
128
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Court determined that smoking in public places constitutes a violation of the
non-smoking members of the public's right to life, as prescribed under
Article 22 and the non-smoking members of the public's right to a clean and
healthy environment under Article 39 of the Ugandan Constitution.134
In Mexico, both interested nongovernmental organizations and individual
plaintiffs are claiming that Mexico's recently enacted tobacco control law
insufficiently protects the right to health that is guaranteed under Article 4 of
the Mexican Constitution.'3 ' According to the plaintiffs, constitutional rights
are normally determined by the legislature because the Constitution
establishes only a simply stated right without significant guidance as to its
content.136 However, in the case of the right of the public to be protected
from the dangers of tobacco, Mexico signed and ratified the FCTC, which
therefore became Mexican law under Article 133 of the Mexican
Constitution, which provides that ratified treaties are "Supreme Law of the
entire Union." 37 Because the FCTC provides "known and detailed"
restrictions on tobacco use, advertising, and promotion, the plaintiffs argue
that the Mexican legislature may not pass a law with standards lower than
those set forth in the FCTC for tobacco promotion and protection from
second-hand smoke. 3 8
The tobacco industry and associated interests assert rights as well.
Typically the industry argues that mandatory, as opposed to voluntarily,
imposed smoke-free public places, as detailed in Article 8(2) of the FCTC,
violates personal liberty or private property rights (for hotel and restaurant
owners, for example).139 Yet under both international law and domestic law,
rights are generally balanced against the responsibility of the State to protect
public health.14 0 As the Guatemala Constitutional Court determined,
A.pdf (ruling that failure to protect citizens from tobacco smoke violated the right to life and the
ri to a clean environment in the Ugandan Constitution).
135 Oscar A. Cabrera & Alejandro Madrazo, Human Rights as a Toolfor Tobacco Control in
Latin America, 52 SALUD PJBLICA DE MtXICo S288, S288-97 (2010) (detailing the litigation

strategy of these plaintiffs).
36

Id.

Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.] as amended, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
138 See Personalidad. En Contra Ley General para el Control del Tabaco, Procede el Amparo
Indirecto, Daniel Gershenson Shapiro Expediente en Juicio de Origen: 1802/2008 Recurso de
Revisi6n (arguing that the Mexican legislature is in breach of the FCTC provisions to which it
agreed to abide).
3 Jessica Niezgoda, Kicking Ash(Trays): Smoking bans in Public Workplaces, Bars, and
Restaurants Current Laws, Constitutional Challenges, and ProposedFederal Regulation, 33
J. LEGIS. 99, 111-13 (2006).
140 See Tamara Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV.
2583, 2587 (2008) (discussing the impact that extending First Amendment rights to
corporations will have on the government's ability to regulate public healthcare, safety, and
137
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the establishing of limits on smoking in certain places does not
imply [as alleged by the Guatemala Chamber of Commerce]
that the State has promoted a limitation of the freedom of
industry and commerce of the entities manufacturing. . . and
marketing tobacco products, as the purpose of the challenged
norm is not to regulate such activities, but to regulate their
consumption to protect the right to health of the consumers
themselves, and that of nonsmokers. 14 1
Indeed, national authorities interpreting the right to life have arrived at
different conclusions as to the extent to which smoke-free public places can
be read to be part of that right under domestic law.142
C. Article 11: Packagingand Labeling of Tobacco Products
Tobacco manufacturers and their affiliated marketers and advertisers have
been shown to manipulate the information on tobacco product packaging,
including the shape and size of the package itself, to increase the likelihood
that the product will be purchased and consumed. This manipulation
includes minimizing or obfuscating mandatory health warnings, using
misleading descriptors like "light," and "ultra-light," and shaping cigarette
containers-e.g., to mimic famous perfume packaging or a lipstick
container-to appeal to target populations.143 The most recent packaging
and labeling innovations include the use of "tear tape" to promote product
use and shape messages as to recent legislative or product changes.

general welfare). See also PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS 51-52 (Lawrence 0. Gostin ed.,
2002) (stating that the government is primarily responsible for assuring the health of its
people); Chuan-Feng Wu, State Responsibility for Tobacco Control: The Right to Health
Perspective, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 379, 380 (2008) (discussing the
government's responsibility to protect its citizens' "internationally recognized right to
health"). See generally Tom L. Beauchamp & Ruth R. Faden, The Right to Health and the
Right to Health Care, 4 J. MED. & PHIL. 118 (1979) (discussing whether the state has both
affirmative and negative duties to provide health care to its people).
141 Decision of the Guatemala Constitutional Court [Docket 2158-2009] p. 15 (on file with
author).
142 See TEAN v. Att'y Gen. & NEMA, supra note 133 (ruling that failure to protect citizens
from tobacco smoke violated the right to life and the right to a clean environment in the
Ugandan Constitution). See, e.g., Wockel v. Germany, App. No. 32165/96, 25 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 156 (1998) (holding that the German legislature's failure to enact more farreaching prohibitions on public smoking did not violate the applicant's right to life under
Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights in light of other tobacco control
measures implemented by the German government).
143 CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO FREE KIDS ET AL., DEADLY IN PINK: BIG TOBACCO STEPS UP ITS
TARGETING OF WOMEN AND GIRLS 2 (2009), available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/
20090218deadlyinpink.pdf.
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Article 4 of the FCTC sets forth the guiding principle that "every person
should be informed of the health consequences, addictive nature and mortal
threat posed by tobacco consumption.

.

."4

This principle undergirds not

only Article 11 on packaging and labeling, but also Article 13
recommendations aimed at limiting tobacco advertising, promotion, and
sponsorship. Article 11 provides that:
1. Each Party shall, within a period of three years after entry
into force of this Convention for that Party, adopt and
implement, in accordance with its national law, effective
measures to ensure that:
(a) tobacco product packaging and labelling do not promote
a tobacco product by any means that are false, misleading,
deceptive or likely to create an erroneous impression about
its characteristics, health effects, hazards or emissions,
including any term, descriptor, trademark, figurative or any
other sign that directly or indirectly creates the false
impression that a particular tobacco product is less harmful
than other tobacco products. These may include terms such
as "low tar," "light," "ultra-light," or "mild"; and
(b) each unit packet and package of tobacco products and
any outside packaging and labelling of such products also
carry health warnings describing the harmful effects of
tobacco use, and may include other appropriate messages.
These warnings and messages:
(i) shall be approved by the competent national
authority,
(ii) shall be rotating,
(iii) shall be large, clear, visible and legible,
(iv) should be 50% or more of the principal display
areas but shall be no less than 30% of the principal
display areas,

1"

FCTC, supra note 11, art. 4.
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(v) may be in the form of or include pictures or
pictograms.
2. Each unit packet and package of tobacco products and any
outside packaging and labelling of such products shall, in
addition to the warnings specified in paragraph 1(b) of this
Article, contain information on relevant constituents and
emissions of tobacco products as defined by national
authorities. 5
3. Each Party shall require that the warnings and other textual
information specified in paragraphs 1(b) and paragraph 2 of
this Article will appear on each unit packet and package of
tobacco products and any outside packaging and labelling of
such products in its principal language or languages.14 6
The Article 11 guidelines explicitly address the importance of requiring
effective packaging and labeling measures to protect consumers.147 It is the
145 Id. art. 11. See also The O'Neill Institute et al., Shadow Report to the Periodic Report
by
the Government of Brazil, Preventing and Reducing Tobacco Use in Brazil: Pending Tasks;
Addendum RegardingMethodsfor Tar and Nicotine Measurement, U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc., &
Cultural Rights, 42nd Sess., paras. 1-3 (May 4-22, 2009), availableat http://www2.ohchr.org/eng
lish/bodies/cescr/docs/info-ngos/PrevReduceTobaccoBrazil42.pdf.
In 1966, the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) adopted a
standardizing testing method, known as the Cambridge Filter Method or FTC
method, for the measurement of tar and nicotine yields of cigarette smoke.
Under the International Organization for Standardisation (ISO), similar
testing methods were adopted for use around the world. There are two major
weaknesses built into health claims based on the ISO/FTC methods: (1)
machine-measurements of tar and nicotine are not valid estimates of the
amounts of tar or nicotine received by smokers; and (2) many smokers
mistakenly believe that lower yield or light cigarettes deliver less tar, produce
lower rates of disease and are therefore 'safer.' In 2008, the FTC rescinded
its guidance regarding the FTC machine-based testing stating that 'machinebased measurements of tar and nicotine yields based on the Cambridge Filter
Method do not provide meaningful information on the amounts of tar and
nicotine smokers receive from cigarettes or on the relative amounts of tar and
nicotine they are likely to receive from smoking different brands of
cigarettes.' They found the machine-based testing to be 'poor predictors of
tar and nicotine exposure [. . . primarily due to smoker compensation - i.e.,
the tendency of smokers of lower-rated cigarettes to take bigger, deeper, or
more frequent puffs, or to otherwise alter their smoking behavior in order to
obtain the dosage of nicotine they need.
Id
146 FCTC, supra note 11, art. 4.
147 See, e.g., Osterreichische Schutzgemeinschaft Fur Nichtraucher and Rockenbauer v.
Austria, App. No. 17200/91, Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. (1991) (holding that restrictions
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aim of the Article 11 guidelines to "assist Parties in meeting their legal
obligations under Article 11 of the Convention, and to propose measures that
Parties can use to increase the effectiveness of their packaging and labeling
measures."1 48 While the Article 11 guidelines contain much of the
conditional language found elsewhere in the guidelines, certain obligations
flow from the mandatory language of the treaty text-specifically that States
Parties: (1) take effective measures within three years of ratification or
accession; (2) do not, in accordance with national law, permit descriptors that
may mislead consumers as to the health effects of tobacco products,
including the impression that one tobacco product is less harmful than
another; (3) take "effective measures" to include warnings that are rotating,
large (no less than 30% of package area), clear, visible, and legible; and (4)
use warnings that contain information on constituents and emissions.149
Those provisions of the guidelines related to meeting these Article 11
obligations are mandatory while those that are proposed to increase
effectiveness are or may be advisory to the extent they can be distinguished.
Certainly, when determining its own obligations, a State is obliged to
consider the guidelines in their entirety, since they represent the body of
research that informs "effective measures" for purposes of implementation:
8. Article 11.1(b)(iii) of the Convention specifies that each
Party shall adopt and implement effective measures to ensure
that health warnings and messages are large, clear, visible and
legible. The location and layout of health warnings and
messages on a package should ensure maximum visibility.
Research indicates that health warnings and messages are more
visible at the top rather than the bottom of the front and back of
packages. Parties should require that health warnings and
messages be positioned:

on advertising that misleads consumers about the health risks of tobacco products are
consistent with the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights); U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding
Observations:Armenia, 1 53, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Ad. 119 (Feb. 24, 2000) (encouraging the
State Party to continue its efforts to provide children with accurate and objective information
about tobacco use and to protect them from harmful misinformation by imposing
comprehensive restrictions on tobacco advertising).
148 FCTC, Guidelinesfor Implementation of Article II of the WHO Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control (Packagingand Labeling of Tobacco Products), art. 1 (2009) [hereinafter
Guidelinesfor Implementation: Art. 11], available at http://www.who.int/fctc/guidelines/artic
le 11.pdf.
m FCTC, supra note 11, art. 11.
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- on both the front and back (or on all main faces if there
are more than two) of each unit packet and package, rather
than just one side, to ensure that health warnings and
messages are highly visible, recognizing that the frontal
display area is the one most visible to the user for most
package types;
- on principal display areas and, in particular, at the top of
the principal display areas rather than at the bottom to
increase visibility; and
- in such a way that normal opening of the package does
not permanently damage or conceal the text or image of the
health warning. 50
However, the Article 11 guidelines make extensive use of the phrase
"should consider," the ordinary meaning of which advises Parties to include
those recommendations as part of its deliberative process without a
corresponding duty to actually act on those recommendations. For example,
Parties "should consider" warnings larger than 50% of principal display
areas,15 1 messages on adverse environmental outcomes and tobacco industry
practices, targeting subgroups, pre-marketing testing, plain packaging,
responsibility for enforcement, liability related to noncompliance, source
documents, specific penalties available to enforcement agencies, adequate
budgeting, inspectors, public complaint mechanisms, monitoring and
evaluation, impact on target populations, and international cooperation.
The guidelines include stronger recommendations as well. Parties
"should require," inter alia, color warnings, health warnings, and messages
in a specified series to be printed, and "relevant qualitative statements be
displayed on each unit packet or package about the emissions of the tobacco
product."1 52 Similarly, Parties "should also prohibit" any term, descriptor,
trademark, or sign that creates the impression that a particular tobacco
product is less harmful than others, although the FCTC and the guidelines
suggest that such descriptors "may include terms such as 'low tar,' 'light,'
'ultra-light' or 'mild.' "153 The guidelines are clear that the use of the word
"may" means those descriptors are indicative but not exhaustive. The

iso Guidelinesfor Implementation: Art. 11, supra note 148, para. 8.
151 Id. para. 12.

Id. para. 33. For example, read together with Article I1's requirement for "effective
measures," the evidence that qualitative disclosures are misleading and the guidelines'
lanuage lead to more than a mere recommendation. Id. para. 36.
1 Id. para. 43.
1S2
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guidelines, like the treaty provision, therefore establish three gradations of
terms Parties must consider for purposes of interpretation and
implementation: "required" actions, including warnings on principal display
areas; actions to "ensure" a given outcome, like tax stamps not obscuring
warnings; and, actions parties "should consider," like warnings larger than
50% of principal display areas.
D. Article 13: Advertising, Promotion,and Sponsorship
While Article 11 sets forth effective measures for packaging and labeling,
Article 13 focuses on the pervasive influence of tobacco industry
advertisement and marketing to increase consumption and obfuscate the
health risks of tobacco use. Tobacco advertising has been shown to increase
consumption and attract new smokers. 15 4 New smokers in particular tend to
be young and influenced by tobacco advertisements' association between
tobacco and sexual and/or social success, athleticism, courage, and
independence; these attributes easily fascinate adolescents.155 The more
exposed to tobacco advertising young people are, the more likely they are to
use tobacco, which quickly translates into addiction in adulthood. 156
Correspondingly, jurisdictions with comprehensive advertising bans witness
declines in consumption.157 The Article 13 text provides in pertinent part:
1. Parties recognize the comprehensive ban on advertising,
promotion and sponsorship would reduce consumption of
tobacco products.
154 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING TOBACCO USE: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL, ch. 5 (2000), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/

rr4916al.htm; Joe B. Tye et al., Tobacco Advertising and Consumption: Evidence of a Causal
Relationship, 8 J.PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 492, 494-95 (1987).
155David T. Levy, Frank Chaloupka & Joseph Gitchell, The Effects Of Tobacco Control
Policies On Smoking Rates: A Tobacco Control Scorecard, 10 J. PUBLIC HEALTH MGMT. &
PRACTICE 338, 338-53 (2004).
156 Joseph R. DiFranza et al., Tobacco Promotion and the Initiation of Tobacco Use: Assessing
the Evidencefor Causality, 117 PEDIATRICS e1237, e1237, http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/
content/full/117/6/el237; C. Lovato et al., Impact of Tobacco Advertising and Promotion on
Increasing Adolescent Smoking Behaviours, COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS
CD003439 (2003), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/o/cochrane/csysrev/articles/CD03
439/pdf fs.htnl; Dean M. Krugman et al., Understandingthe Role of Cigarette Promotion and
Youth Smoking in a Changing Marketing Environment, 10 J. HEALTH COMM. 261, 261-78 (2005);

Robert J. Wellman et al., The Extent to Which Tobacco Marketing and Tobacco Use in Films
Contribute to Children's Use of Tobacco: A Meta-Analysis, 160 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS &
ADOLESCENT MED. 1285, 1285-96 (2006), availableat http://archpedi.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/16
0/12/1285.pdf.
15 Evan Blecher, The Impact of Tobacco Advertising Bans on Consumption in Developing
Countries, 27 J.HEALTH ECoN. 930, 930 (2008).
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2. Each Party shall, in accordance with its constitution or
constitutional principles, undertake a comprehensive ban of all
tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship. This shall
include, subject to the legal environment and technical means
available to that Party, a comprehensive ban on cross-border
advertising, promotion and sponsorship originating from its
territory. In this respect, within the period of five years after
entry into force of this Convention for that Party, each Party
executive,
legislative,
appropriate
shall
undertake
administrative and/or other measures and report accordingly in
conformity with Article 21.
3. A Party that is not in a position to undertake a
comprehensive ban due to its constitution or constitutional
principles shall apply restrictions on all tobacco advertising,
promotion and sponsorship. This shall include, subject to the
legal environment and technical means available to that Party,
restrictions or a comprehensive ban on advertising, promotion
and sponsorship originating from its territory with cross-border
effects. In this respect, each Party shall undertake appropriate
legislative, executive, administrative and/or other measures and
report accordingly in conformity with Article 21.
4. As a minimum, and in accordance with its constitution or
constitutional principles, each Party shall:
(a) prohibit all forms of tobacco advertising, promotion and
sponsorship that promote a tobacco product by any means
that are false, misleading or deceptive or likely to create an
erroneous impression about its characteristics, health effects,
hazards or emissions;
(b) require that health or other appropriate warnings or
messages accompany all tobacco advertising and, as
appropriate, promotion and sponsorship;
(c) restrict the use of direct or indirect incentives that
encourage the purchase of tobacco products by the public;
(d) require, if it does not have a comprehensive ban, the
disclosure to relevant governmental authorities of
expenditures by the tobacco industry on advertising,

159
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promotion and sponsorship not yet prohibited. Those
authorities may decide to make those figures available,
subject to national law, to the public and to the Conference
of the Parties, pursuant to Article 21;
(e) undertake a comprehensive ban or, in the case of a Party
that is not in a position to undertake a comprehensive ban
due to its constitution or constitutional principles, restrict
tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship on radio,
television, print media and, as appropriate, other media,
such as the internet, within a period of five years; and
(f) prohibit, or in the case of a Party that is not in a position
to prohibit due to its constitution or constitutional principles
restrict, tobacco sponsorship of international events,
activities and/or participants therein.s 8
The Article 13 guidelines explicitly address the importance of
implementing effective regulation of tobacco advertising, promotion, and
sponsorship.1 59 It is the aim of these guidelines "to assist Parties in meeting
their obligations under Article 13" of the Convention. 160 They are meant to
"provide guidance on the best ways to implement Article 13 of the
Convention in order to eliminate tobacco advertising, promotion and
The
sponsorship effectively at both domestic and international levels."''
Article 13 guidelines state that Parties "should" adopt the recommended
measures, although it concedes that some Parties' "constitutions or
constitutional principles" may limit their ability to undertake a
"comprehensive" ban as outlined in the guidelines.1 62 A comprehensive ban
has a broad scope that covers "any form of commercial communication,
recommendation or action with the aim, effect or likely effect of promoting a
tobacco product or tobacco use either directly or indirectly." 63 A
comprehensive ban also includes "any form of contribution" as well as
"corporate social responsibility" programs promoted by the tobacco
158 FCTC,

supra note 11, art. 13.
1' FCTC, Guidelinesfor Implementation of Article 13 of the WHO Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control (Nov. 2, 2008) [hereinafter Guidelines for Implementation: Art. 13],
availableat http://www.who.int/fetc/guidelines/article-13.pdf.
160

Id para. 1.

161 Id para. 2.

162 Id. paras. 1, 7. Indeed, there are existing suits in Argentina and the United
States (neither
a Party to the FCTC) that challenge advertising restrictions on constitutional principles of
conunercial speech.

6' Id. para. 7.
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industry.164 As with the language found elsewhere in the guidelines, the
Article 13 guidelines are sometimes styled "recommendations." These
recommendations, together with their designation as the "best ways" to
implement Article 13, suggest that they are largely advisory for Parties.
Moreover, certain recommendations, like plain packaging, use the "should
consider" language of Article 11:
17. If plain packaging is not yet mandated, the restriction
should cover as many as possible of the design features that
make tobacco products more attractive to consumers such as
animal or other figures, "fun" phrases, coloured cigarette
papers, attractive smells, novelty or seasonal packs.
Recommendation
Packaging and product design are important elements of
Parties should consider
advertising and promotion.
adopting plain packaging requirements to eliminate the
effects of advertising or promotion on packaging.165
The guidelines to Article 13 also give wide discretion to parties as to the
limits imposed by their constitutional systems:
35. Any Party whose constitution or constitutional principles
impose constraints on undertaking a comprehensive ban
should, under Article 13 of the Convention, apply restrictions
that are as comprehensive as possible in the light of those
constraints.
All Parties are obliged to undertake a
comprehensive ban unless they are "not in a position" to do so
"due to [their] constitution or constitutional principles". This
obligation is to be interpreted in the context of the
"recogni[tion] that a comprehensive ban on advertising,
promotion and sponsorship would reduce the consumption of
tobacco products", and in the light of the Convention's overall
objective "to protect present and future generations from the
devastating health, social, environmental and economic
consequences of tobacco consumption and exposure to tobacco
smoke."' 66

'6
65
166

Id. para. 26.
Id. para. 17.
Id. para. 35.
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36. It is acknowledged that the question of how constitutional
principles are to be accommodated is to be determined by each
Party's constitutional system.167
For Parties whose constitutional principles prevent a ban as
comprehensive as envisioned by the treaty and the guidelines, these Parties
are nevertheless obligated to undertake as comprehensive a ban as permitted
by their constitutional principles.16' Finally, the Article 13 guidelines, like
the Article 5.3 guidelines, contemplate a protocol to address cross-border
advertising, promotion, and sponsorship.16 9 Thus, the Article 13 guidelines
share many of the characteristics of the Article 5.3 and Article 11 guidelines
and provide significant discretion to Parties in determining whether their
constitutional systems prohibit a comprehensive ban as outlined in the
guidelines.
While the text of Article 13 and the guidelines do not invoke a "right to
information" as articulated under both international human rights law and the
constitutional law of several States, the guidelines may play a part in
informing the content of that right. For example, the U.N. Committee on the
Rights of the Child (CRC Committee) has identified tobacco consumption
under the Convention's state reporting guidelines.170 Under the General
Guidelines for Periodic Reports established by the CRC Committee, States
are requested to "provide information on legislative and other measures
taken to prevent the use by children of' such substances.' 7 ' In its 2000
Concluding Observations for South Africa, the CRC Committee stated that
they expressed "concern regarding the limited availability of [programs] and
services and the lack of adequate data" in a range of areas, "including
alcohol and tobacco use." 7 2
Similarly, CEDAW makes an explicit link between its textual provisions
The Fourth World
regarding women's health and tobacco control.'17
Conference on Women held in Cairo, and its accompanying Beijing Platform
for Action, acknowledged, "There is significant synergy between the
substantive content of [CEDAW] and the Beijing Platform for Action and

167 Id. para. 36.

1

Id para. 1.

169 Id. para. 10.

U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Guidelinesfor PeriodicReports, 1
157,
U.N. Doc. CRC/C/58 (Nov. 20, 1996).
'1 Id.
172 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee
on
the Rights of the Child: South Africa, 31, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.122 (Feb. 23, 2000).
173 WHO, Women's Rights and International Agreements, in GENDER, WOMEN, AND THE
TOBACCO EPIDEMIC 233 (2010) available at http://www.who.int/tobacco/publications/gender/
entfigender women rights internationalagreements.pdf.
170
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they are therefore mutually reinforcing." 74 Paragraph 100 of the Beijing
Platform for Action also stated, "Women throughout the world, especially
young women, are increasing their use of tobacco with serious effects on
their health and that of their children."17 5 States Parties are under an
obligation to "[c]reate awareness among women, health professionals, policy
makers and the general public about the serious but preventable health
hazards stemming from tobacco consumption and the need for regulatory and
education measures to reduce smoking as important health promotion and
disease prevention activities." 76
Thus the Article 13 guidelines do not provide the same level of obligation
as the Article 8 guidelines, but may nevertheless play a similar role in
informing the content of other human rights and corresponding state
obligations.
IV. THE DEBATE ON COP DECISION-MAKING UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Under orthodox interpretation, the guidelines adopted through unanimous
consent by the FCTC's Conference of the Parties are without serious doubt a
"subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions" under Article 31(3)(a) of the
Vienna Convention, which in turn means that States Parties must use the
guidelines as part of their Article 26 obligation to interpret the treaty in good
faith "in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."7
Recently, scholars debating the significance and legal effect of COP
consensus-based activity have challenged prevailing methods-based largely
on the application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the
division of COP decisions into either "hard" law or "soft" law. This Article
implicitly defends prevailing methods, while acknowledging that they
contain important weaknesses in ascertaining "hard" legal obligations.'
It
174 U.N.

Comm. on the Eliminationof DiscriminationAgainst Women, Annex I, Reporting
Guidelines of the Committee on the Elimination ofDiscriminationAgainst Women, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.6/2008/CRP.1 (Feb. 11, 2008), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/English/bodies/ceda
w/docs/Annexl.pdf.
"7 U.N. Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, 4th World
Conference on Women, Sept. 4-15, 1995, Beiing Declarationand Platformfor Action, T 100
(Sept. 15, 1995), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdflBDPfA%20E.pdf.
Id. 107(o).
177 Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 26, 31(3)(a); see also Daniel Bodansky, The
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary on a
Commentary, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 315 (2000) (noting that the Conventions of the Parties
subsequent to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change are elaborating on
different aspects of the Convention including the Kyoto Protocol).
17 Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art.
31(3)(a).

164

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 39:121

is suggested that these weaknesses lie not in prevailing methods for assessing
COP consensus-based activity, but rather in the more fundamental problem
of developing a workable theory for applying the "good faith" interpretation
doctrine to "vertical" obligations undertaken by States mainly in human
rights treaties, multilateral environmental treaties, framework treaties, and
similar instruments.17 9
A. Alternatives to Article 31(3) (a)
In exploring the effect of the decisions of the Conferences of the Parties in
the context of multilateral environmental agreements, Annecoos Wiersema
argues that scholars have over-emphasized the dichotomous approach of
dividing COP decisions into "hard" law-treaty or custom-based
obligations-and "soft" law.180 Soft law is defined as those agreements that
are not legally binding but nevertheless constrain States to a lesser degree
either because the obligations are imprecise, or because authority to interpret
and implement the law is not delegated to an international organization or
dispute resolution body.' 81 Instead, Wiersema proposes that the degree of
obligation imposed by COP consensus-based activity be understood with
respect to underlying treaty obligations. 182
Wiersema concedes that COP decisions may amount to a subsequent
agreement by the parties, but shapes her analysis for those decisions or parts
of decisions that would not "automatically elevate the activity to being seen
as hard international law." 8 3 For those decisions, Wiersema proposes four
axes by which COP decisions might be understood to "thicken" underlying
obligations: (1) voting and level of consent, (2) delegated consent, (3) intent,
and (4) effect in implementation.184 Here, these axes are modified to show
that Wiersema's framework can provide the foundation of a workable
instrument for applying "good faith" in the vertical context.
This Article has already set forth its defense that the unanimous,
consensus-based decisions of the FCTC's COP qualify as a "subsequent

See, e.g., Wiersema, supra note 27 (identifying the weaknesses within current practices
in treaty interpretation).
180 Id. at 232-33.
181 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in InternationalGovernance,
54 INT'L ORG. 421, 422 (2000); see also Christopher J. Borgen, Resolving Treaty Conflicts, 37
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 573, 642-43 (2005) (noting that soft law agreements are legally
non-binding).
182 Wiersema, supra note 27, at
256.
181 Id. at 247.
184 Id. at 250-51.
179
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agreement" under Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention. 18 Before
applying the Wiersema framework within the context of the Vienna
Convention, it is worth examining whether the FCTC guidelines might
impose custom-based obligations or have force as soft international law.
1. Customary InternationalLaw
The Statute of the International Court of Justice acknowledges customary
international law in Article 38(1)(b), incorporated into the United Nations
Charter in Article 92: "The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance
with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall
apply. . . international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law."iss Customary international law consists of rules of law derived from
the consistent conduct of States acting out of the belief that the law required
them to act that way. 18 7 Customary international law can be discerned by
widespread repetition by States of similar international acts over time (state
practice): acts must occur out of sense of obligation, and acts must be taken
by a significant number of States and not be rejected by a significant number
of States.' 88 "A marker of customary international law is consensus among
States exhibited both by widespread conduct and a discernible sense of
obligation."l 89
For the most part, there has been insufficient time to identify "state
practice" with regard to the guidelines. Certainly, as a matter of practice,
States regard guidelines issued pursuant to international treaties as
binding.' 90 Yet even where a practice becomes widespread, States must
indicate that they are doing so out of a sense of obligation that they owe to
the guidelines.19' For example, Australia and Brazil officially represent that
transparent interactions with the tobacco industry are key aspects of their
185Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 31(3)(a); see supra Part III (interpreting the

FCTC).

186 U.N.

Charter, art.

92.

SHABTAl ROSENNE, PRACTICE AND METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW 55 (1984).

187 BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY 892 (8th ed. 2009).
188 Marci Hoffman, International and Foreign Legal Research: Customary International

Law and Generally Recognized Principles (2007), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/class
es/iflr/customary.html.
189 ROSENNE, supra note 186.

Interview with Edith Brown Weiss, Francis Cabell Brown Profess of International Law,
Georgetown University Law Center (April 21, 2010).
191 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 45, 77 (Feb. 28),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/51/5535.pdf ("Not only must the acts
concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a
way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it.").
190
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national tobacco control strategies. However, Australia makes an explicit
link between transparency and its compliance with Article 5.3 guidelines,
while Brazil does not. 192 The strongest reading of the Article 5.3 guidelines
would absolutely prohibit the participation of the tobacco industry in the
"formulation and implementation of public health policies for tobacco
control."l 93 Given that major international tobacco companies like Japan
Tobacco Inc. and the China National Tobacco Company are also state
monopolies or have States as major stakeholders, there may be limits on the
extent to which Article 5.3 guidelines may become customary international
law (although Thailand provides an important case where a state-owned
monopoly and a relatively strong tobacco control regime coexist).194
Australian Gov't: Dept. of Health & Ageing, Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(last modified Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.health.gov.au/intemet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/tobac
co-cony.
193 Guidelinesfor Implementation: Art. 5.3, supra note 76.
194 See TOBACCO MERCHANTS Assoc., U.S. CIGARETTE EXPORT MARKET PENETRATION IN
THAILAND: A MULTIMILLION DOLLAR OPPORTUNITY FOR U.S. LEAF PRODUCERS (1988). The
Thailand Tobacco Monopoly (TTM) manufactures cigarettes for local and export markets; from
1943 to 1992, TTM-which replaced British American Tobacco-was the exclusive local provider
of tobacco products. Tobacco control efforts during this time largely consisted of marginal changes
in health warnings as a result of pressure from public health and medical associations. Id See
Frank J. Chaloupka & Adit Laixuthai, US. Trade Policy and Cigarette Smoking in Asia (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5543, 1996), available at http://papers.nber.org/pa
pers/w5543 (discussing the health policy response of Asian countries once markets were opened to
the U.S. cigarette industry). See also Sombat Chantomvong & Duncan McCargo, Political
Economy of Tobacco Control in Thailand, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL 48, 48-54 (2001), available at
http://tc.bmjjoumals.com/cgi/content/full/10/l/48. In 1992, Thailand opened its tobacco markets in
response to trade sanction threats by the United States. Id. See also P. Vateesatokit, B. Hughes &
B. Ritthphakdee, Thailand Winning Battles, but the War's Farfrom Over, 9 TOBACCO CONTROL
122, 122-27 (2000) (discussing the GATT controversy raised by the United States against
Thailand's restrictive tobacco legislation under its health policies); GATT Panel Report, ThailandRestrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes,DSIO/R - 37S/200 (Nov. 7, 1999),
availableat http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/thaicigarettes.pdf (presenting report of
the GATT panel on the United States' request for consultations conceming Thailand's internal
taxes on cigarettes); Press Release, World Health Organization, WHO Commends Thailand'sPath
Breaking Anti-Tobacco Efforts - Cautions Against Any Let Up (May 31, 2000), http://www.searo.
who.int/en/Section3l6/Section503/Section2373 12983.htm (commending the health justifications
and milestones reached by Thailand's restrictive tobacco legislation despite strong opposition to
their health policies). Thailand simultaneously passed two key tobacco control laws-the Tobacco
Products Control Act (TPCA) and the Non-Smokers Health Protection Act. P. Vateesatokit et al.,
Thailand Winning Battles, but the War's Farfom Over, 9 TOBACCO CONTROL 122, 123 (2000);
Douglas Bettcher & Ira Shapiro, Tobacco Control in an Era of Trade Liberalization, 10 TOBACCO
CONTROL 65, 65-67 (2001). Thai law requires health warnings on not less than 25% of the package
area, prohibition of cigarette sales to children under eighteen years, and prohibition of smoking in
closed public buildings. One of the most important aspects of the Act was that it demanded the
disclosure of constituents and emission products to the Ministry of Public Health. Thailand is only
one of a few countries in the world that has such a law. Cigarette packages were also banned from
using descriptors such as "light" and "mild" and required labeling with nine pictorial health
warnings on rotation. Between 2007 and 2009, the Thai government enforced certain tobacco
192
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The Article 8 guidelines, on the other hand, show significant promise for
obtaining the status of customary international law. Not only are the Article
8 guidelines (and the underlying norm they reflect) the oldest, permitting
longer time for state practice to follow, but they also uniquely identify as an
aim assisting Parties to fulfill their obligations as to the right to life and the
right to the highest attainable standard of health, as embodied in General
Comment 14 to the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural
Rights, adding comprehensive protection from tobacco smoke as an essential
aspect of an obligation already undertaken by many States.' 95 As with other
guidelines, there is not yet sufficient evidence of state practice to determine
whether States are adopting the definitions provided in the Article 8
guidelines, although certain States have adopted legislation consistent with
the guidelines.19 6 Recently, China, a massive consumer and producer of
tobacco products, has stated that it will honor commitments under the FCTC
to create smoke-free public places in all indoor public venues and
workplaces, as well as in trains, buses, and other modes of transportation. 9 7
The current trend suggests that Article 8 guidelines-or at least the norm
they reflect-may obtain the status of customary international law.
The guidelines for Articles 11 and 13 share the same short life as the
Article 5.3 guidelines. With regard to Article 11, the guidelines themselves
permit wide variations in the content, form, placement, and process for
developing warnings and labels.' 98 While some standardized practice may
develop with respect to certain aspects of the Article 11 guidelines, it is too
Moreover, because the Article 11
soon to identify these measures.
guidelines' purpose is to "propose measures" that "can" be used for
control strategies such as enacting and amending the law that prohibits the sale of tobacco products
to minors, and not allowing the importation of fruity flavored cigarettes, which generally target
women. The TPCA enforces a total ban on tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship
wherein all forms of advertisement are prohibited, i.e., direct advertising, point-of-sale advertising,
product placement in all media, and trademark diversification. All forms of promotion are also
banned, e.g., free giveaways, exchanges, rebates, and discounts. P. Vateesatokit et al., Thailand:
Winning Battles, but the War's Farfrom Over, 9 TOBACCO CONTROL 122,125 (2000); C.D. Tori &
R. Siripanich, Prevalenceand Connotative Meaning of Cigarette Smoking Among Thai Adolescents
and Young Adults, 77 J. MED. Assoc. THAI. 378, 378-83 (1994).
19 Guidelinesfor Implementation: Arts. 5.3, 8, 11, 13, supra note 13.
196 See GLOBAL SMOKE FREE PARTNERSHIP & CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS,
EXAMPLES OF GOOD SMOKE-FREE LEGISLATION 4-5 (2009) (noting the current national and
sub-national legislation in force that most closely resembles best practices in legislation),
availableat http://www.tobaccofreecenter.org/files/pdfs/en/SF legislation examplesen.pdf.
'9 Chinainsists Will Make Good on Smoking Ban Pledge, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE GLOBAL
EDITION, May 11, 2010, http://www.sinodaily.com/afp/100511081312.ivqO7hs3.html. "About
350 million of China's 1.3 billion people smoke cigarettes, with the nation consuming up to
one-third of the tobacco products sold annually worldwide, according to the Chinese
Association on Tobacco Control." Id.
198 Guidelinesfor Implementation: Art. 11, supra note
148.
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compliance, 99 it will be difficult to argue that States develop a practice out
of a sense of legal obligation (as opposed to choosing certain equally valid
alternatives).
2. Soft Law
Soft legal agreements are not themselves legally binding, but are created
with the expectation that they will be given the force of law through either
domestic law or binding international agreements.200 Soft law relates
specifically to guidelines of conduct.20 1 In relation to treaties, it means that
"soft law is not binding"; "soft law consists of general norms or principles,
not rules"; and "soft law is law that is not readily enforceable through
binding dispute resolution." 2 02 The effect of structuring an obligation as soft
is a reduction in the costs to deviating from legal expectations. This
resonates because a soft legal obligation only implicates a State's reputation
for compliance indirectly-through the expectation that the non-binding
203
rules will be given some binding effect in another legal instrument.
Soft principles can furnish a conceptual frame of reference for future
agreements and facilitate the crystallization process that gives rise to
customary law. They also contribute to the larger body of law by
establishing informal norms of behavior. 204 By taking the form of soft law,
resorting to recommended measures permits governments to address
problems collectively, without imposing limits on their ability to act.20 5 In

199 Id. para. 1.
200

Timothy L. Meyer, Soft Law As Delegation, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 888, 890 (2009).

201 PETER MALANCZUK, AHEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 54-

55 (1997).
202 Alan E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 901, 901-02 (1999).
203 Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of InternationalAgreements, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L.
579,
591 (2005); Charles Lipson, Why Are Some InternationalAgreements Informal?, 45 INT'L
ORG. 495, 495 (1991); Christopher C. Joyner, Recommended Measures Under the Antarctic
Treaty: Hardening Compliance with Soft InternationalLaw, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 401, 401-02
(1998).
204 See generally B. Peter Rosendorff & Helen V. Milner, The Optimal Design of
International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape, 55 INT'L ORG. 829 (2001)
(acknowledging that escape clauses increase flexibility of an international trade agreement by
adding discretion for national policymakers); Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT'L
L. 307 (2006) (discussing reservations as a way of tailoring treaties as they apply to specific
countries); Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REv. 1579 (2005) (analyzing
unilateral exits from treaties), Barbara Koremenos, Loosening the Ties That Bind: A Learning
Model of Agreement Flexibility, 55 INT'L ORG. 289 (2001) (discussing how states can form
flexible international agreements).
205 Andrew Byrnes & Jane Connors, Enforcing the Human Rights of Women: A Complaints
Procedurefor the Women's Convention?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 679, 702 (1996).
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the context of banking, trade, arms control, the environment, and human
rights, guidelines permit governments to refine and experiment with new
notions or in a non-binding situation,20 6 thus providing immediate benefits
while laying the structural foundation for negotiating binding requirements at
a later time. Soft law agreements are especially beneficial to developing
countries, which are relieved of the often high costs of enforcement and
implementation that accompany legally binding rules. In this manner,
developing countries have the freedom to progressively implement soft
international laws.
As soft international law, the FCTC guidelines-that do not, per se,
impose mandatory action-provide a similar platform by which to: (1) hold
both governments and tobacco industry participants accountable, and (2)
crystallize certain measures that may serve as the basis for protocols or
customary international law in the future. The guidelines to Article 5.3
explicitly contemplate that the COP may develop a protocol with respect to
tobacco industry interference that may be adopted as binding legal rules
related to conflicts-of-interest, transparency, and monitoring.20 7 The COP
will have several years to observe and collect data on Parties' practices
related to Article 5.3 and Article 13,208 so that legally binding rules created
through protocols can be effectively negotiated and implemented. Similarly,
domestic actors will be able to use the gathering evidence regarding smokefree environments to pressure governments to adopt expansive definitions of
"public places" and "workplaces" that require 100% smoke-free air, as
required by the Article 8 guidelines.209
The evidence is mounting that the FCTC guidelines are exercising
influence consistent with notions of "soft law." In July 2009, the organizers
of the Shanghai World Expo 2010 returned approximately $29 million to the
Shanghai Tobacco Corporation based in part on China's ratification of the
FCTC and promise to undertake a comprehensive ban of tobacco advertising,
promotion, and sponsorship by 2011, consistent with the Article 13
guidelines. 2 10 In a meeting between the Australian Department of Health and
Ageing (Department) and British American Tobacco held on January 22,
2009, the Department issued a public notification of the meeting, stating that
206 See

ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 226-27 (1995) (detailing
regulatory and non-binding regimes administered by the IMO, the OECD, the ITU, and the

ICAO).
207 Guidelinesfor Implementation:Arts. 5.3, 8, 11, 13, supra note 13.
201
209

id
id.

210 Shanghai Expo Refuses 200 Mn Yuan from Tobacco Group, GLOBAL TIMES, July 21, 2009,
http://business.globaltimes.cn/industries/2009-07/449305.html. Organizers of the Expo specifically
cited China's signing of the FCTC as the reason for returning the donation. Id.
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Guiding Principle Number 2 of the guidelines for Article 5.3 states: "Parties,
when dealing with the tobacco industry or those working to further its
interests, should be accountable and transparent." 2 1 1 On April 12, 2010, the
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation withdrew a $5.2 million grant to Canada's
International Development Research Centre-a public body created by
Parliament in 1970 to promote public health and fight poverty-because its
chair had previously sat on the board of Imperial Tobacco Canada. 2 12 While
the Gates Foundation referred only to a "conflict," 2 13 the termination of the
grant followed significant civil society activity anchoring their objections in
the Article 5.3 guidelines.2 14
3. The Bangalore Principles
The Bangalore Principles were developed by the Judicial Group on
Strengthening Judicial Integrity, a group of senior judges from eight African
and Asian common law countries. 2 15 This group was formed in 2000 under
the auspices of the Global Programme Against Corruption of the UN Office
for Drug Control and Crime Prevention in Vienna.2 16 The principles were
subsequently adopted by a conference of chief justices from the major legal
traditions in November 2002. The Bangalore Principles are generally
directed at judiciaries, rather than the State, for implementation and
enforcement.2 17

Guidelinesfor Implementation: Arts. 5.3, 8, 11, 13, supranote 13, at 5.
Press Release, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Statement Regarding IDRC Tobacco
Control Grant, Apr. 12, 2010, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/press-releases/Pages/statement
-on-idrc-grant-100412.aspx.
211

212

213

Id
See, e.g., CANADIAN NoN-SMOKERS' RIGHTS ASSOCIATION & SMOKING AND HEALTH
ACTION FOUNDATION, CANADIAN CONVENIENCE STORES ASSOCIATION AND THE NATIONAL
COALITION AGAINST CONTRABAND TOBACCO: INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS OR GROUPS
FRONTING FOR BIG TOBACCO? 5 (2010), available at http://www.nsra-adnf.ca/cms/file/pdf/wh
o funds the CCSA and NCACT.pdf (finding CLSA and NCACT allies, according to
Article 5.3, of the tobacco industry).
215 Global Programme Against Corruption Conferences, Vienna, Austria, Apr. 15-16, 2000,
214

Report of the FirstMeeting of the Judicial Group on StrengtheningJudicialIntegrity, CICP-6
(2000).
216

Id.

See Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive
Incorporationof Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 648 (2007) (emphasizing
centrality of judges as "key mediators between the international and domestic human rights
regimes").
217
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According to Michael Kirby, the Bangalore Principles state, in effect:
(1) International law (whether human rights norms or
otherwise) is not, as such, part of domestic law in most
common law countries;
(2) Such law does not become part of domestic law until
Parliament so enacts or the judges (as another source of lawmaking) declare now the norms thereby established are part of
domestic law;
(3) The judges will not do so automatically, simply because the
norm is part of international law or is mentioned in a treaty even one ratified by their own country;
(4) But if an issue of uncertainty arises (as by a lacuna in the
common law, obscurity in its meaning or ambiguity in a
relevant statute), a judge may seek guidance in the general
principles of international law, as accepted by the community
of nations; and
(5) From this source material, the judge may ascertain and
declare what the relevant rule of domestic law is. It is the
action of the judge, incorporating the rule into domestic law,
which then makes it part of domestic law.
[T]here is a growing tendency for national courts to have
regard to these international norms for the purpose of deciding
cases where the domestic law - whether constitutional, statute
or common law - is uncertain or incomplete. It is within the
proper nature of the judicial process and well-established
judicial functions for national courts to have regard to
international obligations which a country undertakes whether or not they have been incorporated into domestic law
for the purpose of removing ambiguity or uncertainty from
national constitutions, legislation or common law.218

Conference Report, Michael Kirby, Austi. Nat'l Univ. Fac. L., Domestic Implementation
of International Human Rights Norms (December 6, 1997), http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/
publications/speeches/former-justices/kirbyj/kirbyj inthrts.htm. See also U.N. Judicial Group
on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices, Vienna, Austria,
Nov. 25-26, The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002), available at http://www.
218
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The key idea behind the Bangalore Principles is that international law
might provide guidance to judges in cases concerning issue-areas that span
common law jurisdictions.2 19 Under the Bangalore Principles, therefore,
judges and courts are encouraged to use international laws and norms. 22 0
The FCTC guidelines not only support certain principles of international
law, e.g., that comprehensive protection from tobacco smoke is a
fundamental element of the highest attainable standard of health, but also
provide specific definitions that can fill gaps in domestic law. These
definitions include, inter alia, "second-hand tobacco smoke" or
"environmental tobacco smoke," "smoking," "public places," "indoor" or
"enclosed," "workplace," and "public transport." 22 1
In some jurisdictions, legislatures have explicitly used language from the
guidelines in drafting the statutory and regulatory framework. For example,
Guatemala incorporated the Article 8 guidelines' definition of "enclosed"
when drafting its law prohibiting smoking in enclosed public places.222 On
March 6, 2008, the Uruguayan Parliament passed Law 18.256, which shared
in pertinent part this language from the Article 13 guidelines:223
Parties should prohibit the use of any term, descriptor,
trademark, emblem, marketing image, logo, colour and
figurative or any other sign that promotes a tobacco product or
tobacco use, whether directly or indirectly, by any means that
are false, misleading or deceptive or likely to create an
erroneous impression about the characteristics, health effects,

unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/judicial group/Bangaloreprinciples.pdf (providing the text
of the Bangalore Principles).
219 See Commonwealth Secretariat, Report of Judicial Colloquium on the Domestic
Application of International Human Rights Norms (Feb. 26, 1988), reprinted in The
BangalorePrinciples on the Domestic Application of InternationalHuman Rights Norms, 14
COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 1196 (1988) ("WHEREAS the foregoing fundamental principles
and rights are also recognized or reflected in regional human rights instruments, in domestic
constitutional, statutory and common law, and in judicial conventions and traditions . . . .").
220 Michael Kirby, The Impact ofInternationalHuman Rights Norms-A "Law Undergoing
Evolution," 22 COMMONWEALTHL. BULL. 1181, 1183-84, 1189-91 (1996).
221 WHO Guidelines, supra note 25, paras. 14-22. See supra pp. 142-45 (defining these
terms).
222 Law for the Creation of Tobacco Smoke Free Environments, Decree 74-2008, art. 3
(Guat.).
223 Conf. of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Durban, S.
Afr., Nov. 17-22, 2008, Elaboration of Guidelines for Implementation of Article 13 of the
Convention, U.N. Doc. FCTC/COP/3/9 (Sept. 2, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 WHO Conf. of the
Parties], availableat http://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop3/FCTCCOP3 9-en.pdf. While the
guidelines were not officially adopted until November, 2008, Uruguay sat on the working
group for the guidelines which met at least as early as November 2007. WHO, PREvious
WORKING GROUPS (2010), available at http://www.who.int/fctc/cop/previouswgbeforecop.pdf.
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hazards or emissions of any tobacco product or tobacco
products, or about the health effects or hazards of tobacco
use.224
Where legislatures do not define these terms or where meaning is
ambiguous, lawyers and judges in many jurisdictions may assert the legal
force of these definitions as well as principles included in the guidelines. As
an example of a court using the FCTC to supply terms of local law, the
Israeli High Court of Justice awarded compensation to an individual to be
paid by a restaurateur for violation under FCTC and illegal exposure to
secondhand smoke. 2 25 "Justice Elyakim Rubinstein allowed the appeal of Irit
Shemesh, a pregnant woman exposed to secondhand smoke in a Jerusalem
restaurant .... " 2 26 The court ruled that, in addition to criminal enforcement,
Israeli law recognized a mechanism of civil enforcement for a citizen "who
sues for compensation from those who manage or own a public place but
[take no steps against smoking in it]." 22 7 Justice Rubinstein noted that all
countries that ratified the FCTC have agreed that secondhand smoke causes
"death, disability and illness," and these countries "assumed responsibility
for the protection of their inhabitants from exposure to [tobacco smoke]."228
While the specific application in that case was to import an acknowledged
causation standard, as opposed to the specific definition of an ambiguous
term, the application foresees courts' use of the guidelines to interpret
domestic law.
B. The Wiersema Axes
Instead of conventional classifications like "treaty," "custom," and "soft"
law, Wiersema proposes that COP decisions be analyzed with respect to
"consent, intent, and effect" to understand a given activity's legal status. 22 9
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties-especially Article 31-may
take Parties a long way toward compliance, but "unless a tribunal is willing
to see COP activity as something more than soft law or more than an
224 2008 WHO Conf. of the Parties, supra note 223, at 11
(citation omitted). "The use is
hereby forbidden of terms, descriptive features, trademarks, signs or of any other sort of sign
which may directly or indirectly create the false impression that a given tobacco product is
less harmful than another." (Author's translation.) Id.
225 Judy Siegal-Itzkovich, Court Acts on Israel's Poorly Enforced Ban on Workplace
Smoking, 333 BIuT. MED. J. 218, 218 (2006) (citing LCA 9615/05 Shemesh v. Fouata Ltd.
89(2) LR (2006)).
226 Id.
227 id.
228 Id
229 Wiersema, supra note 27,
at 250.
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interpretive device," Parties will be unable to use COP consensus-based
activity to "override an existing treaty obligation." 2 30 At the risk of
oversimplifying Wiersema's nuanced contribution, that proposition is tested
within the context of the FCTC guidelines to determine whether something
more than soft law or Article 31(3)(a) is critical for understanding the
relationship between underlying treaty obligations and the FCTC guidelines.
1. Axis 1: Voting and Level of Consent
Stated plainly, the number of votes matters for purposes of ascertaining
obligations arising from COP-based activity. Unanimity, under this axis,
does and must mean more than a simple majority or even a super-majority;
indeed, at the point of unanimity, one might argue that the distinction
between "consent" and "consensus" disappears.
While the FCTC does provide for the use of a super-majority vote in cases
where consensus cannot be reached, all the guidelines so far have been
adopted by unanimous consent, or without objection, providing support for
the argument that the guidelines have become "a new agreement between the
parties or some form of instant or emerging customary international law." 231
2. Axis 2: Level ofAuthorization by the Treaty
Under this axis, the key inquiry is the degree to which the underlying
treaty grants the COP authority to implement or enforce specific parts of the
treaty. For the FCTC, this inquiry would add weight to the unanimously
approved guidelines for Articles 8, 11, and 13. The FCTC provides that:
Each Party shall adopt and implement effective legislative,
executive, administrative or other measures necessary to
implement its obligations pursuant to Articles 8 to 13 and shall
cooperate, as appropriate, with each other directly or through
competent international bodies with a view to their
implementation. The Conference of the Parties shall propose
appropriate guidelines for the implementation of the provisions
of these Articles.2 32
Yet the FCTC does not specifically authorize the COP to adopt guidelines
for Article 5.3. Article 5.4 provides, "The Parties shall cooperate in the
formulation of proposed measures, procedures and guidelines for the
230

231
232

Id. at 278.
Id at 251.
FCTC, supra note 11, art. 7.
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implementation of the Convention and the protocols to which they are
Parties." 233 However, this provision might be read to only include
"guidelines" elsewhere authorized, or it might be interpreted to mean that the
COP must adopt guidelines for Articles 8 through 13, but may adopt
guidelines for other provisions.
3. Axis 3: Intent
Subsequently, Wiersema argues that COP activity "varies in the type of
language used to address the parties and in who is addressed-the states or
subsidiary bodies." 2 34 "Resolutions" might differ from a "decision," and
therefore carry more or less legal weight. Within these activities, the internal
language will matter-"shall" and "should" will tend to create or expand
obligations, while "urge" and "recommend" will tend to be merely advisory.
Under this analysis, the FCTC provides little guidance as to the intended
Certainly, "guidelines" are the principal
weight of the guidelines.
implementing mechanism authorized by the treaty text, but there is little
evidence as to what binding legal effect those decisions were intended to
have. Indeed, as described at the beginning of the Article, the major nonParty constituencies appear to be either uncertain or mistaken as to the legal
effect of the guidelines.2 35 With respect to the precise language used within
COP decisions, it is not clear that ascertaining normative "intent" provides
greater clarity than understanding unanimously adopted guidelines to
constitute a "subsequent agreement" to the treaty and applying normal
principles of interpretation.
4. Axis 4: Effect in Implementation
Finally, Wiersema asks: "Do the parties implement these COP resolutions
and decisions or act as though they are legally binding?" 236 While evidence
as to Parties' compliance with the FCTC guidelines is still emerging, some
preliminary conclusions can be drawn. First, the Article 8 guidelines
represent the most widespread state practice, as Parties accept-at the very
least-that non-smokers should be protected from tobacco smoke in enclosed
public places. Second, the Article 11 and Article 13 guidelines alternatively
recommend that certain actions be taken with respect to their provisions, but
also state others with legally binding force. For example, the Article 11
Wiersema, supra note 27, at 253.
id
235 See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text (describing WHO's,
the tobacco
industry's, and civil society's perspectives on the guidelines).
236 Wiersema, supra note 27,
at 255.
233

234
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guidelines are clear that "low tar," "light," "ultra-light," or "mild" are among
descriptors that should be banned because they may lead to a false
impression that one tobacco product is less harmful than another, while
merely advising that color be used for graphic warnings.237 The Article 5.3
guidelines are ambiguous in this respect because they are simultaneously
conditioned on the "sovereign right of the Parties" to determine their tobacco
control policies, but are guided by the principle that "[t]here is a fundamental
and irreconcilable conflict between the tobacco industry's interests and
public health policy interests. ,,23 8 Significantly, the inquiry as to whether
Parties "act as though [the guidelines] are legally binding" closely tracks one
of the central inquiries for determining customary international law. 239
5. The Significance of COP Votes
As applied in the context of the FCTC guidelines, Wiersema's axes
generate a conclusion that overlaps to a great extent with the application of
Article 31(3)(a). Indeed, Wiersema's primary illustrative vehicle for her
thesis is a comparison of American and Dutch authorities interpreting COP
decisions affecting two different multilateral environmental agreements. In
the former, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
determined that COP decisions on methyl bromide within the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone layer did not have the force
of law in the U.S. because they had not been adopted by formal
adjustment.240 In the latter, the Netherlands Crown determined that one of its
protectorates was obligated to perform Environmental Impact Assessments
(EIAs) under the Ramsar Convention, based in significant part on the fact
that conducting EIAs was included in resolutions and recommendations by
the treaty's COP.241 However, the Crown's decision was based in significant
part on the determination that the decisions of the COP fell within the
purview of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention and that the
resolutions had been adopted unanimously. 242
The application of Wiersema's axes exposes a relatively unexplored
question of treaty interpretation: the extent to which, and under what
circumstances, unanimity matters. Churchill and Ulfstein phrase it this way:

237
238
239
240

Guidelinesfor Implementation:Art. 11, supra note 148.
Guidelinesfor Implementation:Arts. 5.3, 8, 11, 13, supra note 13.
Wiersema, supranote 27, at 255.
Id. at 265-68.

241

id.
Id.

242
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Consensus decision taking has replaced straightforward
majority voting as a result, in Buzan's pithy phrase, of "the
divorce of power from voting majorities"; 243 in such a situation,
taking decisions by majority voting becomes undesirable
because of the risk of alienating powerful minorities that may
simply ignore those decisions. In view of the consequent need
for "a technique that [would] ensure very broadly based
support for decisions in a highly divided system," 244 consensus
decision making developed. While this procedure promotes the
taking of decisions that are likely to be universally acceptable,
it does have some drawbacks. It is likely to slow down the
reaching of decisions and to lead to decisions that represent the
lowest common denominator..

.

. Consensus decision making

also raises the questions of, first, what is meant by consensus,
and, second, how long the search for consensus must continue
before resort may be had to voting. As regards the first
question, consensus is usually taken to mean the absence of
formal objection to a proposed decision (which is not
necessarily the same as unanimity). 24 5 As regards the second
question, no precise answer can obviously be given.246
Certainly, civil society groups have used the unanimity of adoption as part
of their persuasive. case for ratification or implementation of the FCTC and
the guidelines. However, currently there appear to be no cases where a
domestic tribunal made a determination that unanimity in the adoption of the
FCTC guidelines is relevant.247
It should be noted that this Article tests Wiersema's axes in a single case
of a related but not perfectly analogous treaty context. While the World
Health Assembly drew heavily upon the experience of multilateral
243 Barry Buzan, Negotiating by Consensus: Developments
in Technique at the United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 75 AM. J.INT'L L. 324, 325-26 (198 1).
244 Id. at 327.
245 Patrick Sz6ll, Decision Making Under Multilateral Environmental Agreements,
26
ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 210, 212 (1996).
246 Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional
Arrangements in
MultilateralEnvironmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in InternationalLaw,
94 AMER. J.INT'L L. 623, 642-43 (2000).
247 Press Release, Corporate Accountability International, Big Tobacco
Attempts to Smuggle
Loopholes Into Global Tobacco Treaty: Retifying Countries Criticized for Collaboration with Philip
Morris International and British American Tobacco (July 1, 2009), http://www.stopcorporateabuse.
org/release-big-tobacco-attempts-smuggle-loopholes-global-tobacco-treaty; Smokefree Partnership,
Protection from Exposure to Tobacco Smoke, 2 SPOTLIGHT ON FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
TOBACCO CONTROL (FCTC) 8 (2008), http://www.smokefreepartnership.eu/IMG/pdf/ers-SL-01.
pdf
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environmental agreements for the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control in its initial stages, the treaty is different in important respects. Yet
it is a suitable example to explore alternatives or supplements to Article
31(3)(a). The fact that the guidelines are unanimously adopted is given
greater weight under Wiersema's framework than the Vienna Convention,
which is, understandably, less clear on the issue. One can predict under this
framework that Article 5.3 would give rise to less rather than more legal
obligation than Articles 8, 11, and 13 because the FCTC explicitly gives the
COP authority to issue guidelines for Article 8 through 13, but not for Article
5.3. Yet experience shows that the Article 5.3 guidelines have exerted
significant influence-in a way that typifies the transition from "soft" law to
"hard" law-on the actions of both Parties and non-Parties. Axis 3 and Axis
4, respectively, closely follow the inquiries made under Article 31(3)(a) of
the Vienna Convention and customary international law.
V. A QUESTION OF GOOD FAITH

Article 31(3)(a) essentially brings the FCTC guidelines within the ambit
of "good faith" interpretive mandates. Yet for framework conventions in
general and the FCTC in particular, many of the obligations imposed by the
treaty are national or domestic in nature, and therefore raise difficult
questions at the intersection of sovereignty and the good faith doctrine. The
FCTC mentions "good faith" only once, in essence restating Article 18 of the
Vienna Convention: "Member States that have signed the Convention
indicate that they will strive in good faith to ratify, accept, or approve it, and
show political commitment not to undermine the objectives set out in it." 24 8
Even in focused studies of the amorphous doctrine of pactasunt servanda
("agreements must be kept"), the good faith concept is more easily
articulated as a "horizontal" principle necessary for the proper functioning of
contracts, including treaties. 24 9 The ordinary meaning of good faith is
248 FCTC, supra note 11, at VI. Article 18 of the Vienna Convention
requires that all States,
whether they are signatories or parties to a treaty, have the obligation that they will not defeat
the object and purpose of the treaty. Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 18.
249 See ELISABETH ZOLLER, LA BONNE Fol EN DRoIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1977) (providing
a comprehensive review of the origins, interpretations and effects of the good faith doctrine);
JOHN F. O'CONNOR, GOOD FAITH ININTERNATIONAL LAW (1991) (emphasizing the role of pacta
sunbt servanda in the context of treaty-making). "Pactasunt servanda-the rule that treaties are
binding on the parties and must be performed in good faith-is the findamental principle of the
law of treaties." Draft Articles on the Law of Treatieswith Commentaries, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 187, 211, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties provides, "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must
be performed by them in good faith." Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 26. The Preamble
to the Vienna Convention on the Law Treaties notes, "[T]he principles of free consent and of
good faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule are universally recognized." Id pmbl. Nor does the

2010]

THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE FCTC GUIDELINES

179

"honesty of purpose or sincerity of declaration" or the "expectation of such
qualities in others." 25 0 The principle-described as the foundation of all laws
and a fundamental principle of law-is an accepted norm of customary
international law, and includes within it notions of fairness and
reasonableness. 2 5 1 This principle was used as a general principle of law
during the drafting of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.252 The
UN Charter also requires that all States should in good faith fulfill their
duties under international law.253 In addition, customary international law
places a duty on every State to fulfill its obligations under international law
and international agreements.254 Similarly, the obligation to fulfill treaty
obligations in good faith proscribes a State Party from undertaking any act,
which could be interpreted as averting or diverting from the object and
purpose of the treaty.255 The duty of a State Party extends to not only
comply by the "letter of the law, but also to abstain from acts which would
inevitably affect their liability to perform the treaty." 256
With respect to treaty obligations that impose a change in the internal or
domestic order, the coherence of the good faith principle diminishes. For
example, Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) provides:

principle allow for partial application. Thus, the European Community argued to the United
States in 1986: "[s]elective adherence to the principle 'pacta sunt servanda' erodes the very
foundation of the international order." European Community, Memorandum to the United States
Concerning the Financial Situation of the United Nations (Mar. 14, 1986), reprintedin 25 I.L.M.
482 (1986).
250 Andrew D. Mitchell, Good Faith in WTO Dispute Settlement, 7 MELBOURNE J. INT'L L.
339, 340 (2006) (citation omitted).
251 O'CONNOR, supra note 249, at
2.
252 See Mitchell, supra note 250 n.7 (citing Lord Phillimore, Comments in
Permanent Court
of Justice: Advisory Committee of Jurists, June 16-July 24, 1920, at 335) ("Good faith was
recognised as a general principle of law during the drafting of the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice.").
253 U.N. Charter art. 2,
para. 2.
254 Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625 (XXV), at 124, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 1883d Plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/2625 (Oct. 24,
1970). See also R.I.R. Abeyratne, The United Nations Decade ofInternationalLaw, 5 INT'L J.
POL., CULTURE & Soc'Y 511 (1992) (discussing the increasing formal and informal acceptance
of international law and the role of the U.N. in this process).
255 See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, State Responsibility and the 'Good Faith' Obligation in
International Law, in ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL
INSTITUTIONS 75, 93 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Danesh Sarooshi eds., 2004) (noting that
avoiding responsibilities of a treaty also results in a lack of good faith separately from direct
violations of a treaty).
256 Summary Record of the 727th Meeting, [1964] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 27, 32, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SR.727.
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Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other
measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes
to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional
processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to
give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.25 7
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR provides: "Each State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes to take steps ... to the maximum of its available
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including
,,258
Smlry
ril
Similarly, Article
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
2(1)(d) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination provides: "Each State Party shall prohibit and bring to
an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by
circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or
organization...."259

There are similar provisions in the CEDAW, the Convention against
Torture, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.260
Despite the calls from advocates, scholars, and U.N. Committees as to the
applicability of the good faith doctrine for treaty provisions that require
domestic action, the proposition is mostly used in a tautological and
unsatisfactory manner.26 1
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, para. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
258 ICESCR, supra note 120, art.
2(1).
259 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art.
2 (d), openedfor signatureMar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 212.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 24,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14 ("States Parties undertake to adopt all necessary measures at
the national level aimed at achieving the full realization of the rights recognized in the present
Convention."); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 2(1), adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 ("Each State
Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts
of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction."); Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 4,
adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 ("States Parties shall undertake all appropriate
legislative, administrative, and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized
in the present Convention." (emphasis added)).
261 Yuval Shany, How Supreme is the Supreme Law of the Land? ComparativeAnalysis of
the Influence of International Human Rights Treaties Upon the Interpretation of
Constitutional Texts by Domestic Courts, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 341, 349 (2006); Joshua D.
Reader, The CaseAgainst China: EstablishingInternationalLiabilityfor China's Response to
the 2002-2003 SARS Epidemic, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 519, 561-62 (2006); Gillian White,
The Principleof Good Faith, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw 230, 240 (Vaughan Lowe & Colin Warbrick eds., 1994) ("The obligation to perform
treaty commitments in good faith applies equally to situations in which the provision falls to
257
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While some may dispute that there is a distinction in the practical
applicability of the good faith doctrine between "horizontal" application
between sovereigns and the "vertical" application exclusively within a State,
the position can be defended at the theoretical level with at least three
arguments. First, treaty provisions dealing with internal processes often
provide significant flexibility to States Parties. The ICCPR and CERD
provisions above are consistent with this formulation, as is Article 5.3 of the
FCTC: "In setting and implementing their public health policies with respect
to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect these policies from commercial
and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national
law."
Second, incorporating international law norms into domestic law requires
significant flexibility to harmonize those norms within often-complicated
networks of laws and regulations. Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith
illustrate this quagmire in the context of the ICCPR:
Can one say for sure that the absence of proportional
representation in the United States is consistent with the
ICCPR's "right of self-determination? Is the Supreme Court's
rejection of Lochner - style economic rights consistent with
the ICCPR's guarantee of the right "freely [to] pursue their
economic .. . development"? Are U.S. campaign finance laws
consistent with the international human right to "have access,
on general terms of equality, to public service?" 262
Third, without another sovereign alleging conduct that affects its interests,
an equally influential principle of international law-non-interferenceconflicts with what might be characterized as conduct violating good faith
compliance. Article 27 of the FCTC implicitly acknowledges this reality by
providing for settlement of disputes as to interpretation or application only
between "two or more Parties. 2 63
To demonstrate the difference between horizontal and vertical
applications of good faith, compare two guideline provisions from Article
5.3 and Article 13. Article 5.3 Recommendation 4.8 provides, "Parties
be carried out by the State itself.. . and to those in which the provisions are implemented by
its nationals."); Malvina Halberstam, United States Ratification of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
EcoN. 49, 63 (1997); Aaron N. Lehl, China's Trade Union System Under the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights: Is China in Compliance with Article 8?,
21 U. HAW. L. REv. 203, 223 (1999); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties,
Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 399, 461-63 (2000).
262 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 261, at 462.
263 FCTC, supra note 11,
art. 27.
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should not allow any person employed by the tobacco industry or any entity
working to further its interests to be a member of any government body,
committee or advisory group that sets or implements tobacco control or
public health policy." The Article 13 guidelines provide:
A comprehensive ban on advertising, promotion and
sponsorship originating from a Party's territory should also
ensure that a Party's nationals-natural persons or legal
persons-do not engage in advertising, promotion or
sponsorship in the territory of another State, irrespective of
whether it is imported back to their State of origin.264
Not only are the Article 5.3 guidelines conditioned on the "sovereign right
of the Parties to determine and establish their tobacco control policies," 2 65
but challenging conduct related to Recommendation 4.8 on the basis of good
faith would be difficult. Under U.S. law, for example, the Food and Drug
Administration regulates tobacco products.266 The FDA, in turn, is advised
by the Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee (TPSAC), which is
tasked with providing advice, information, and recommendations to the
Commissioner of the FDA on health and other issues relating to tobacco
products. 26 7 Three non-voting seats on the TPSAC are delegated to tobacco
industry representatives.268 If the U.S. ratified the FCTC, would it then be
vulnerable to challenges as to its good faith implementation if it did not
remove industry representatives from TPSAC? If so, who would be
empowered to bring those challenges? With cross-border advertising, not
only is it clear that Parties must respect cross-border advertising provisions
and refrain from taking any action that would violate stricter advertising
policies in a neighboring State, but the treaty itself also provides a
mechanism by which a dispute might be resolved.
Alternately stated, neither Wiersema's axes nor orthodox application of
the Vienna Convention's interpretive principles appear to resolve the more
fundamental weakness of international law-making in the framework treaty
context; treaty provisions that affect the domestic order are subject only to an
undeveloped theory of "good faith" or to the robustness of domestic
institutions. With respect to the latter, the use of international law to shape
domestic debates fits the classic conceptions of "soft" law of which the
FCTC guidelines must be viewed as a preliminarily successful form.
264
265
266
267
268

Guidelinesfor Implementation: Art. 13, supra note 159, para. 3(a).
Guidelinesfor Implementation:Art. 5.3, supra note 76, para. 5.
21 U.S.C. § 387(a) (2009).
Id. § 387(q).

Id. § 387(q)(b)(1)(b).
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VI. CONCLUSION

While scholars continue to assess the nature of consensus-based decisions
of Conferences of the Parties as a source of international law, this Article
demonstrates that the prevailing approach-identifying binding obligations
imposed by treaty or custom and understanding other aspects as having
normative force of varying intensity-provides a relatively sharp and useful
method for ascertaining legal obligations. Under traditional canons of treaty
interpretation, the guidelines approved by the COP of the FCTC include both
advisory and obligatory language. For example, the guidelines impose a
mandatory obligation with respect to a State's duty to protect its population
from tobacco smoke; the Article 8 guidelines specifically associate the "key
elements of legislation necessary to effectively protect people from exposure
to tobacco smoke" with the treaty's requirement to provide protection as part
of the highest attainable standard of health.269 In contrast, other guidelines
''propose" measures that Parties "can" use to increase the effectiveness of
certain aspects of the treaty. Similarly, the Article 5.3 guidelines on
protecting public health policy from tobacco industry interference and the
Article 13 guidelines on banning tobacco advertising, promotion, and
sponsorship supply mostly advisory language. Yet these guidelines also
specifically allow for the development of protocols drafted under Article 33
to impose relatively stronger legal regimes for those issue-areas, and have
exercised significant influence consistent with notions of "soft" law. The
international legal principle of good faith may strengthen certain claims
within the guidelines. Given that only a short time has passed since the
adoption of the guidelines, there is insufficient evidence to support a case
that the guidelines constitute customary international law at this time,
although the Article 8 guidelines show early promise. The guidelines finally
provide a valuable source for defining and interpreting certain terms and
principles required for implementing effective measures to protect
populations from the hazards of tobacco consumption.

269

WHO Guidelines, supra note 25, para. 3.

